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The subject of this thesis can be said to be of
far-reaching interest to humanity in that it vitally concerns
not only the nature of man's existence on this planet, but also
the very foundations for his mental advancement to an undreamed
of insight into the great and noble traditions of what may be
termed the true human situation.
The writer has to confess that when he set out to trace
the record of the emergence of the human mind as stated within
the theory of evolution; the "neuronic tangle," if one may so
term the miracle of the human brain, beset him with the almost
stupifying immensity and complexity of the problem before him.
It was at this crucial stage that the very modest
brilliance of my Promoter, Prof , G.A. Rauche, backed by his
unique international scholarship not only in philosophy, but in
the higher reaches of science as well, came to my rescue and the
way ahead became inspiringly clear. Man had emerged frcxn
primitive existence into a new world of startling beauty and
profundity and all that he required now in order to preserve his
near-godly state, Was to guard and protect the heritage which
had become his. It is no exaggeration to say that frcxn the
. manent Professor Rauche opened the doors ahead of me, wi th that
patience, kindness and efficacy so essential in philosophical
debate that I was able to see clearly along the road ahead.
From then on, I felt I was privileged to be travelling side by
side/ ...
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side with a philosopher uniquely aware of the human situation
and all it entails, and it became a journey of deep
inspiration~
For the devoted and highly efficient processing of this
thesis, I am indebted to Michelle Nienaber of Price Waterhouse,
Durban.
-III-
THE EMERGENCE OF MIND, A THEDRY IN EVOLUTION
An Abridgment
This thesis defends a theory that mind or mental capacity is
a phenomenon that has gradually emerged in meaning and complexity
along with the gradual enlargement of the brain over the past two
million years or so, the latter enlargement being recorded in
palaeontological research.
The increase in brain volume was necessitated under changing
conditions .surrounding man's early existence, such material increase
entailing a corresponding gradual increase in neuronal conductivity.
This process of s9phistication gave rise to increasing mental
capacity, which likewise became more sophisticated as brain volume
and neuronal connectivity continued to evolve.
Emergence of a more complex physical brain with its
accompanying electro-chemical neuronal intercorrmunication network,
particularly in the cortex or roof-brain, brought about
consciousness and the power of thinking, which in turn gave rise to
self-awareness, such remarkable properties arising in mental
capacity also giving rise to man's ability to recognise a "self" as
well as his physical body.
The whole force of the above theory of the emergence of mind
in/ •••
-IV-
in evolution, as is researched throughout this thesis, rests on the
hypothesis that such a .force is directional, and secondly that such
directional change is purposeful, and that the basis for this
purposeful emergence is by virtue of little understood properties
inherent in matter, the latter a term used in common speech for the
materials of the universe and which physical science has reduced to
ultimate particles and forms of energy.
The potential therein has provided the "basic thrust" which
has given rise step-by-step to man as he exists to-day. Such
purposeful advance has of course, been attained by specified levels
of biological efficiency provided for the advance of man through
evolutionary stages.
With man having evolved to an awareness of a "self", he is
also an end in himself, embodying moral, ethical, aesthetic and
religious persuasions. Such a state of mental autonomy has emerged
with increasing rapidity over the last half million years or so and




Evidence accumulated so far is extremely convincing
that man has reached his present advanced status by a gradual
process of evolutionary change, and with such change goes the
theory that the human mind has likewise gradually emerged in
conjunction with the development of brain volume, which latter
has been clearly indicated in uncovered fossil discoveries which
are dateable.
The whole force of the argument is that it is unlikely
that man suddenly possessed t~epotential of a neuronic brain
capable of giving rise to experiencing selr-consctousness and
subjectivity.
The earliest known true ancestors of man as maintained
by evolutionary science, were the Australopithecine families,
and it goes without saying that those primitive, slightly
ape-like ancestors did not possess sufficient mental capacity to
. distinguish the self from the material body. What mental
capacity they did have was sufficient for their primitive way of
life, just as future development and emergence was designed to
cope with changing circumstances of life over the ages.
Having briefly reviewed and discussed the dawn and
advance of life in the first chapter, the study outlines the
emergence and development of consciousnes~ from the time of the
Australopithicines, early known representatives of man in
the/ ...
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the haninid line. This second chapter argues on the nature of
consciousness and self-consciousness, pointing out amongst other
things that the smaller early hominid brain volume, with its
limi ted neuronal development, could not have been capable of
providing the sophistication of the larger brain volume with all
its remarkable systems of neuronal connectivity.
The emergence of mind-state in living organisms is an
extremely unique phenomenon~ Man's first ver~ebrate ancestor,
the fish, for example, was, many millions of years before
haninids appeared, considered to be the possessor of only
specific neural pathways fran the skin, causing sensitivity to
touch and no more.
Successive progress towards refinement indicates that
the age-old hypothesis that matter itself is the possessor of
life-force appears to be authentic in philosophy, for brain
could not be capable of emerging to almost three times its
volume over two mi11ion years without a driving, . purposeful
life-force in matter, let alone the production of a highly
sophisticated mental capacity induced to cope with historically
altering conditions of existence.
Such an argument as the above does not appear to have
been stressed sufficiently before, and it is the intention of
this thesis to argue -Ln support of it by reference to recent
neurophysiological research and by reference to the long and
honourable history of philosophy dating back to the early
Greeks. In connection with the Greeks, it was their early
theory/ •••
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theory of hylozoism that pronounced all nature as endowed with
mind on the analogy of the existing human individual.
This original force is detected in some later systems of
materialistic philosophy, though there are also many
philosophies which choose to destroy the hylozoic conceptsllch
as those of functionalistic inspired systems of thought, and
attempts to prevent man from leading an existence with his true
nature exercised in the cause of ultimate freedom.
According to Spinoza, life and mind are not visitants in
this world, but are blended with matter. This holistic concept
is evidenced also in Bergson's "thrust of life" or vital force.
Evolution is the outcome of an impulse of life, elan vi tal,
manifesting itself in innumerable forms.
In the present work, it is implied that evolution is not
identical with change, but with orderly sequence through changes
in which new and purposeful features emerge. For there to be
truth in existence, purpose or real ends are involved, otherwise
life would become chaotic. Such purpose is infinite in nature,
as argued by Anaximander, otherwise the objects of creation
~Juld necessarily come to an end because of the ceaseless
demands of changing life. There is also the Milesian argument
stating that so-called "inanimate" objects possess life, which
is an attempt to explain causal forces, development and
emergence.
Such a cosmic principle is believed to be the force
originating mental capacity and its emergence- to higher levels
in the selected hominid line. In other words, matter originally
contains/ •••
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contains its own means of animation. What was started on earth
millions of years ago is moving forward by an inexorable law
inherent in the fundamental nature of matter and designed
towards an end.
Consequently the emergence of mental capacity from
Australophithecus onwards, is in tune with the basic concepts of
the history of most past philosophy.
As it presently exists, mental capacity, more commonly
referred to as mind, has biologically emerged into a sphere of
autonomy over the past several thousands of years. In such a
sphere all may not necessarily be well for man, who has
continued also with his disposition for conflict still lingering
from his primitive past where it was necessary for his
preservation from extinction.
It is argued, however, that Such a disposition will
gradually become less assertive, and further emergence of mental
capacity lead man to a deeper understanding of the purpose and
value of existence within the environment of the natural world.
-5-
I NTRODUcrION
In evolutionary theory it is maintained that human
beings are an amalgam of the past, their basic pattern traceable
to the very beginnings of vertebrate history in the Ordovican
Period of about four hundred and fifty million years ago. It is
further maintained that, in order to understand ourselves, we
have to learn to recognise the age-old elements from which we
have emerged and how and why they go together as they do. It
has also been argued that genes still carry messages that
primitive humans once needed for survival, which could be a
feature of much importance in contemplating the basic nature of
modern man.
The general view is that evolution is the natural
addition of infonnation given . to living organisms to enhance
their capaci ty to survive under changing condi tions. Man has
come to need an ever increasing variety of means to avoid
extinction, strange as that concept may seem, and has so far
achieved such by an evolved capacity for conscious selection of
various possibilities over the past many thousands of years.
The remarkable growth of neural tissue in early man I s
brain, stood him well in this respect, the brain attaining its
maximum volume about a hundred thousand years ago (Figure 1,
Page 28), with the Neanderthals attaining a brain volume of
fifteen to sixteen hundred ml, slightly larger than that of
modern man to-day.
This capacity was scarcely put into use until many
thousands/ •••
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thousands of years later, which, it could be said lay like a
luxury in their skulls. Of course the reason for such
ineptitude was in the lack of neuronal connectivity, in other
words in the active organised or trained quality of grey matter,
al though its general structure was little different fran a
structure which in modern times could give rise to genius. The
reason obviously was the lack of neuronal intercarmunications
via neuronal modules in the cortex, that is, complexly organised
assemblages of some thousands of neurons each, resembling in
sane respects integrated micro-circuits of electronics, only far
more ccmplicated. It has been maintained that this kind of
assemblage in dynamic operation could possibly have given rise
to the self-conscious mind, though such is as yet pure
conjecture.
The incredible feature about brain evolution is how and
why a fairly hairless, scavenging ape-like creature such as
Australopithecus had within him the potential of such a miracle
of neurona,l organisation as the cerebral module ready in his
brain for further correct usage. Such a brain was not fully
prepared for use until some million and a half years later, and
the still more remarkable feature is its survival to become what
various scientists regard as one of the greatest and most
intricate wonders of the world.
Fran early times, men of intellect have given their
attention to such disciplines as philosophy and science in
attempts to elucidate the nature of man and the environment he
exists in. The early Greeks were an amalgam of philosophy and
science and exemplified with exceptional brilliance the natural
-7-
reflective quality of the individual. Much of their
truth-perspectives have been superceded in the course of
historical accumulation of knowledge, but the method they used,
namely an open, critical and reflective approach has hardly been
equalled. It is of interest to observe that from the Platonic
view there can be no philosophy where there is no science.
After the breakdown of the early strongly scientific-
orientated philosophy, the trend swung the other way, that is to
reconstruction along moral, ethical and intellectual lines, and
both philosophy and science proceeded on the assumption that
there is sane fundamental reality which can be discovered, and
that the beliefs of both Plato and Aristotle that man should
live peacefully and constructively in harmony with nature was
desirable. In the Middle Ages, this was to be sought largely
through faith, but arguments over the virtues of faith versus
reason led to the breakdown of the med ieva.I world-view, a
break-down which was accentuated by discoveries and inventions,
a shifting of interest from God to man as the centre of the
world and a new interest in the natural sciences and a new
approach to philosophy as well, a divergence of view between
reason and experience. The transcendental philosophy of Kant
was that both reason and experience are the constitutive source
of knowledge, but there must be a continual striving to try and
know truth, though ultimately it transcends human
understanding.
The philosophic struggle about truth and the problem of
human existence swayed back and forth, but in the meantime a
natural/ •••
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natural scientist by the name of Charles Darwin set about a
voyage of discovery in the world of nature and fonnulated the
belief that evolution proceeds by natural selection of heritable
variations. In a certain sense Darwinism closed the gap between
early Greeks and the modern concept of evolution. Sahakian
writes (1969) "Anaximander also contributed a theory of
evolution strikingly close to the Darwinian hypothesis, for he
attributed organic life to the action of fluid in drying up
sufficiently to fonn fish-like creatures which developed into
animals through a process of adapting themselves to life on
land. The human species was the end result of this process of
adaptation."
Since the time of Darwin there has been much interest in
the theory of evolution, particularly with respect to the
emergence of mind and its relation to the neuronic brain. Jules
Fabre stated that the brain was "life's crowning mental gift."
Sherrington described the brain as an organ whose "precision
beggars any imagery I may have," and J.Z. Young, the biologist
stated, "A brain to me means ' a set of nerve cells of imnense
complexity whose intense activity is continually directed to
furthering the life of a particular individual." The latter
phrase is the key to the reason why the large brain, which is
the hallmark of man, should have evolved as remarkably as it
did. The main reason for this relatively rapid evolution of
neural tissue might well be regarded as a means of preserving
man from extinction. If such were true is it not regrettable
that he is now using this miracle of organisation to further,




The main feature of brain evolution has been the
corresponding Emergence of mind with the dawning of the truth
that we are free conscious individuals capable of personal
experiencing and personal thinking.
One . of the inescapable beliefs surrounding such
emergence is the purposiveness of the process of change. Is it
directional or chance? Human reason is not able to be certain
and even consciousness itself cannot be completely understood
by means of either logical, scientific or mathematical analysis.
In other words the miracle gift of the brain~ind complex is not
forthcoming with an answer. But man has a deep yearning to
know, and it is in this yearning that there dwells a certain
security that there is purpose taking man forward, such purpose
being manifest in the truth of existence itself.
The Raman Catholic priest-philosopher, Teilhard de
Chardin, a student of evolution, ventured beyond the limits of
Soholasticism, in which man and nature were very largely lost
from view, to distinguish in the real world a "material tI outer
side and a tlspiritual tl inner side. In other words, there is no
such thing as an existent that is solely physical, nor an
existent that is solely reminiscent, but rather only matter that
will become spirit (1959). Such a philosophy that in the world
there is neither matter nor spirit but a world-stuff which is a
combination of both, is in truth a philosophy which is
reminiscent of Greek hylozoism.
Despite many lateral and downward trends, evolutionary
progress, Julian Huxley maintains (1974), is referable to
specified/ •••
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specified upper levels of biological efficiency attained by life
at successive periods of evolution, that is, those that escape
running up "blind alleys". The raising of this upper level of
efficiency, results from increasing control over the
environment, which is a basic biological fact, and not man,
being anthroparorphic.
T.H. Huxley states that it is the duty of man to strive
and educate himself, so that he should become worthy of
survival. He should not continue having aspirations for
struggling against nature, but use his intuition to defy
destructive cosmic forces, curbing "egoistic instincts" and
constantly afming for a higher level of development with the
remarkable gifts already presented to him in evolution.
In discussing the theory of evolutionary emergence of
mind in the following pages, various moral, ethical and
religious views and conventions are respected and, in
particular, as stated earlier, credence must be given to the
very real possibility of purpose. This indeed may be apparent
when reflecting on the Palaeozoic Era which terminated about two
hundred and seventy million years ago with its extremely hostile
environment. This was the foundation for the extensive
happenings of the succeeding Mesozoic and Cainozoic Eras which
finally gave rise to what many consider the first true man, Homo
erectus, in the Quaternary Period, though the problem still
remains very controversial.
The evolution of man from the Lower to the Upper
Pleistocene Eras, involving slightly less than two million
years, centres round the move towards upright gait, the
recedencej •••
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recedence of the jaw and above all the enlargement of the
cortex. In actuali ty, hand and foot reached the human stage
before brain-size, though it is remarkable that creatures with
ape-size brains could make and use tools about one and three
quarter million years ago, (1965).
The above facts are brought into focus to remind one
that thinking, rational, sentient, highly individual man of
to-day was not always so, and that even the miracle emergence of
mind does not canpletely sever him from the past, nor are we
scientifically justified in assuming that evolutionary processes
which gave rise to the phenanenon of man were anything other
than coepletely normal processes and in no way distinct fran
those of the rest of the living world. Young points out (1978)
that, lIWe may be more inclined to re-examine our attitude to
these questions and to ask how far the properties we ascribe to
minds and hence also to brains, are a result of linguistic
conventions." Young also stresses that a proper study of how
the brain operates will enable us to see more clearly the place
that so-called cultural and spiritual activities play in human
hanoeostasis.
This thesis attempts · to account for factors which
accounted for the emergence of consciousness, personal awareness
of the self and the general structure of autonomy in which the
human mind finds itself to-day, all in the light of emergence.
The disciplines most favoured for this exercise are philosophy
and science, the combination of which also gave rise to the
creative thinking of the early Greeks.
With/ •••
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With the emergence of mind, by virtue of a burgeoning
neuronal brain, man attempts to sort out his place within the
structure of the world he now finds himself in, channelling his
thinking along lines of the various disciplines, utilising the
highly evolved brain to choose possible courses of action
mcx:ielled and established in the vast labyrinth of organised
brain neurons, all overseen, as it were, by the active agency of
the emerged mind. In this manner, man participates as a
thinking, creative unit of human existence. The controversy as
to whether it is the brain or the mind responsible for such
design is skirted, with only occasional reference to the problem
of brain4nind relationship. It is however, noted with interest
that the Russian neurologist, Luria, is emphatic that it is the
brain that creates models of the future. This would imply that
nerve cells, as part of a living system doing things, are
basically creative in themselves with the potential of
inter-camnmication among the many organised millions. Their
main concern, as nature intended, is to maintain the living
systan by the "drive" of the life process, but the pattern of
life has become such that man seeks additional answers to the
way of life, and in this respect he may not always tread with
safety in regard to the natural laws that have brought him to
the eminence he enjoys in the world to-day.
This so-called freedom of the mind to reason and think
is therefore accompanied by a degree of Uncertainty, which is
born out by many conflicting philosophies. Rauche,for example,
points out (1974), that, "As a result of the final collapse of
the old culture and the discrediting of the old cultural norms
and values in consequence of the two World Wars, three
outstanding/ •••
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outstanding forms of the abdication of philosophy emerged:
neo-positivism, contemporary existentialism and neo-Marxism.
The first form takes its origin in the growing importance of the
natural sciences and technology of man's everyday life and for
human existence in general. Paradoxically, the progress and
advance of the natural sciences had reached a point where they
were ·no longer able to present to man a coherent world-view."
Rauche also states further that the existentialist
approach seeks to gain the understanding of man as an
individual through an analysis of his inner experience, or more
suitably his inner moods and his relationship to the world and
to be Absolute, which is the hermeneutic method.
In regard to neo-Marxism, Rauche states that it was an
opinion that in order to be saved, philosophy had to be
destroyed and merged in practice. By such a doctrine it was
hoped to overcome man's alienation from reality and to lead him
to freedom and authentic existence and no longer to continue
dwelling in an ivory tower.
In all the above it is seen how readily philosophy can
turn Iran theory into an analytical and descriptive activity,
which can lead to a curbing of man's free creative thought and
boxing it into closed ideologies, which undoubtedly nature did
not intend when promoting the emergence of mind with its urge
for free self-expression, not of course proceeding forward
blindly but in a realistic sense, taking cognisance of the
perspectives/ •••
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perspectives of Truth as far as such can be understood in the
natural world we are born into.
It has to be appreciated that our intellectual flights
are generated by states of the brain sometimes chemically
induced and that they are given free reign in a neuronic system
which is purely physical and subject to extinction at any time.
The sphere of autonomy to which mind has emerged implies
spontaneous and independent thoughts and impulses, but many of
these are actually guided by obedience and submission and not
from a free recognition of their rightness. For example a man
can go to church regularly to fit in with the judgement of his
community. Etiquette, rules of propriety in social living have
a strong bearing on man's free-will, . but in general he is as an
individual, empowered not necessarily to communicate his inner
thoughts. On the other hand, private intuitionism can be less
beneficial to the state than a sound sociological working out of
problems of generally acceptable appeal which mayor may not
comply with the personality or disposition of the individual,
but to which he adheres for the good of the state or community.
At all events the condition of mental autonomy to Which mind has
emerged through evolution is shaky, but can never deny man the
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DAWN AND ADVANCE OF LIFE
When life dawned on this planet, the beginnings of the
evolution of man were exceedingly ranote and many millions of
years elapsed before any creature resembling man walked the
earth. Palaeontologists and biologists are agreed that
controversy occurs less to-day concerning the ancestry of man,
since as more evidence arises, the nature of his evolution also
becomes more evident, particularly from humanlike fossils buried
under ash from volcanoes, some of which date back nearly three
million years, indicating that the human species is der-ived,..net ,
from a single pair, but a heterogeneous population. There were,
in fact, several distinct lives of creatures later evolving in a
not truly human direction, all having left the forest and begun
to \valk on two legs, probably hunting game on the open plains.
Evolution arises in self~aintaining activities of
molecules characterising a continuum in an assemblage of sets
capable of continuing into the future. In this way, life once
ini tiated continued through all the vast upheavals and
disturbances of earth I s early history. When it is considered
that man's ape-like ancestor, in the Miocene period of about
fifteen million years ago, with a brain volume about one third
that of present man, carried a certain resemblance to man, it
must be realised how very gradual has been the process of
evolution. In this respect, the emergence of mind must have
been an extremely gradual process as well, the initial stages
dating/ •••
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dating back further than the Australopithecinefamil ies, small
in stature, with a brain capacity of about five hundred ml,
about one third that of modern man, but with every indication
that they could very well have been on the direct line of human
descent, though . there is still no full agreement on this.
However, Broan (1937) states : "There seems no doubt that it,
Australopithecus, is the fossil ape nearest to man's ancestor at
present known."
Further discoveries of this part.ial Iy honinid group,
have fairly recently, about 1960, been uncovered in East Africa
and South Africa and there is evidence of Africa-wide
populations of Australopi thecines , and fran evidence gathered
and expressed by Tobias (1965), following the discovery of the
fossil of Homo habilis, the gap is bridged of the last remaining
major interval, in the Pleistocene, of man's evolution.
As regards the abovementioned fundamental issues,
science has shown life to have had a common origin, as evidenced
by the fact of canplex units where the molecules of living
systems are organised within their cells. In fact it is held
. that molecular compounds are collected into cells of
surprisingly Lirni ted forms, where the choice otherwise could
have been so very much more diverse. In this way, life might
very well be defined as an assemblage of cells grouped in a
particular~ay to cope with an environment suitable for
survival , or until circumstances of an al tered environment
modified the assemblage to suit development.
It follows that there is a continuity in living matter
fran/· ••
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from its origin, that is, since the very first organic molecules
occurred and commenced biogenetic growth, in an atmosphere, be
it realised, completely lacking in oxygen and which was
consequently reducing. Objects which resemble fossilised
bacteria and blue-green algae have been found in flint rocks in
Canada, dating back two thousand million years, and in even
older sediments.
In the succeeding Cambrian of six hundred million years
ago, there were numerous fossil molluscs, crustaceous and sea
urchin-like creatures, evolving in an environment which had now
built up a supply of oxygen and replacing the early atmosphere
of methane, ammonia, water, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide,
. " ,,,, '-
the first three of which have been found to presently be the .
atmosphere of the planet Jupiter.
From the foregoing, it can be said that it was basically
a chemical change which guided the course of evolution at that
time, adapting and developing organisms under new environmental
conditions. As is so frequently evidenced, one notices in the
history of evolution, a persistent drive involving selection
between alternative possibilities and so enabling survival under
an ever-widening range of habitats. In this connection, as
organisms have beCQ';1€ more complicated, they have come to need
an ever larger variety of possible actions to avoid dissolution,
making choice also wider and more difficult, reaching its
maximum in human beings, who can live almost anywhere on earth,
even beyond it!
In the philosophy of Bergson, the central principle is
the/ •••
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the reality of change, as indeed it was for the early Greek
philosopher, Heraclitus, many centuries ago. Reality is a flux
of change in an unchanging world. It's very essence is movement
or continuous flow, the living change involving organisms in a
vital forward surge.
It is interesting to note that most nineteenth century
biologists regarded adaptation as a mechanical process whereby
organisms automatically responded to changes in the stimuli from
outside in the environment. T<H:iay it is not regarded as simple
as that, but due also to an underlying urge or thrust or
purpose, Bergson's elan vital, for example.
Ye know now that natural selection of its own does not
cause advance, and in this sense evolution is not necessarily
identical with Darwinism, but it is inevitable that further
emphasis should be given to Darwin's great contribution to
knowledge by a closer philosophic expression of what is really
involved. This is a direction followed by the biologist Ernst
Haeckel in his discussion of the riddle of the universe, though
as a materialist, he did not gain lasting popularity.
If philosophers are unsure of the significance of
change, one thing is certain, life goes on and never stops.
Individuals die, but, and this is important, their genes go on
in the character of man. Genes also of other anllnals and plants
alive to-day, embody . infonnation that has accumulated over
millions of years. But what continues is never quite the same,
for example life is ever finding new ways to exist and in this
respect brain networks are never at rest, but the various
distinct parts pull together to work as a functioning whole,
and/ •••
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and to produce a continuous flow of experience which is best
described as "mental life," the production of which results fran
electrical and chemical events in the brain neurons; · but the
transference does suggest sane alterations in the probability
of future actions of neurons. And that in brief, is also the
very important theory accompanying the emergence of mind.
Palaeontologists who have followed up change in
evolution, have agreed that it is directional, a process quite
undetectable by microelectrodes or any other advanced
instrument. One can only judge such change by "then and now",
the presumable almost ape~like gutteral grunts and signs of the
Lower Palaeolithic iine to Homo sapiens to-day. Speech was not
developed until about two hundred and fifty thousand years ago, ..
that is until sufficient connectivity took place in the frontal
lobes with brain volume much greater. It was about this time
that the loom of language, as Plato calls it, entered into the
fabric of human cul ture in its broadest sense, certainly not
less than a hundred and fifty thousand years ago.
An interesting study made was that when latex rubber was
poured into an ancient and fossilised cranium, it picked up a
very slight impression of the brain that rested there. On a few
casts from two million-year-old skulls, there is a barely
detectable bump over the area which the French anatomist , Paul
Broca, correctly claimed was precisely responsible for
~ranslating ideas into words, which was the first time that any
localised brain function could be traced in man's history. Such
an experiment, which demonstrated that the brain actually had
some kind of comprehensible structure caused great interest
amongst/ •••
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As stated earlier, the evolution of brain was an
extremely gradual process and it is therefore likely that in
human society, language consciousness also emerged gradually,
all of which indicates that we should look to evolution for our
culture. That is the reason it is believed why man should not
look elsewhere for the source of mind, · as though it were a
feature quite unlike anything else in nature. Mind emerged
because/ ••.
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because it was necessary, and still is so, for survival. At
least it has, since its emergence, been responsible for the
tendency or disposition of man and other living things to
maintain a steady state in spite of many changing conditions,
which is the principle of homoeostasis or natural regulation and
control, even using sensors to detect deviations. It is indeed
such homoeostasis which promotes the needs of the young child in
particular. In this respect, there is a large measure of
mechanical control about life. We can live, be happy and
healthy without thinking and planning out our bodily functions,
because they are seen to be done by nature. It is when mental
powers emerge and "overflow", that we turn to a search for a
cosmic background, . the early evidence in pre-historic times
being when man turned to witchcraft. This was followed by the
belief in fictitious beings impersonating natural phenomena, for
example the early mythological cults of many races. The history
of religion shows many stages no longer recognised.
In modern times philosophers recognised the need for man
to acquire a rational view, some keeping pace with the
developnents of modern science, others constructing their own
systems, based on metaphysical conception, Bergson, for example,
emphasising that the universe must be conceived as one
continuous flow, which is alive, evolution being the movement of
the flow, or "continuity of outflow", expressing the universe's
vi tal urge. The world is basically the embodiment of an
immanent principle of living change, a creative force, a
thrusting force, behind or within, a philosophy really
counteracting materialism or mechanistic notions of the
eVOlution of life in nature, and suggesting a rudimentary form
of consciousness in all living organisms. The implications
- -" I
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of this vital philosophy are that mind emerged in capability to
control cerebral activity in a rational direction.
As we pursue the evolution of man along the chain of
life from the Pleistocene through to the Recent, one notes his
gradual acquisition of social habits superseding the law of the
jungle, though aspects of his primitive past still linger.
Nevertheless, as one considers progress in the emergence of
mind, man is by no means at peace, social · and political
disturbances being frequent happenings. Personal intrigues,
sexual jealousy and desire, love of power, thwarted ambition,
slighted vanities and injured prides, all have a part in
determining event~, especially when in the hands of unscrupulous
leaders, with sometimes unpredictable results. As an examale.,
quoted by Bertrand Russell, it was unlikely that the Russian
Revolution would have achieved what it did without the genius of
Lenin, or to take a more fantastic example, it may be maintained
. qui te plausibly that if Henry VI II had not fallen in love with
Anne Boleyn, the United States would not now exist, for it is
owing to this event that England broke with the Papacy and
therefore did not acknowledge the Pope's gift Of the Americas to
Spain and Portugal. The conflict between Communism and
Capitalism could very well have led to barbarism, according to
Russell, a possibility which Marx did not envisage as he had not
taken fully into consideration the enormous increase in man's
power of destruction. That power has now increased out of all
proportion. If this has been an outcome of the emergence of
mind, then it could be interpreted as a misdirection of vital
creative forces, rather than nature's design to restore balance.
The fact remains that such a potential does exist and
man'sj •••
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man's pride of place in the cycle and advance of life could
become indetenninate if he slips out of the main current of
creative vital force as visualised by Bergson. If philosophy is
to be the evaluation of · the facts and values of human
experience, it must surely look to both the future and the past,
as pointed out by D.W. Hamlyn (1984).
Man, though now a highly evolved animal with an
opportunity to acquire self-realisation, is by no means the
centre of the universe, but is still in process, and because of
inhabiting, as he does, an ever-changing world, he must
continually adapt himself in every aspect of human existence.
That is why importance is attached to an acquaintance with the
evolution of man, and in particular to the emergence of mind
within that theory. In this connection, the question has to be
faced as to whether the idea of evolution of mind in energent
evolution, is or is not at variance logically with the general
conception of emergence towards a more fulfilling purpose.
Goudge states (1965) that the concept of emergence has
been analysed with considerable rrecision during recent decades,
so that its meaning is more evident now than it was when first
introduced. Added to this is the vitality introduced into
evolutionary ideas, notably in recent years by such philosophers
as Teilhard de Chardin, whose basic belief was that for all
organisms, the act of existing is an act of evolving, and
essence has to be defined in tenns of directional change.
Teilhard's is a reassuring evolutionary vision, namely, that man
has come into existence from primitive ancestry, and since he is
continuing/ •••
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continuing to evolve, it is understandable that his mental life
will emerge still further. ·"Essence" has to be defined in terms
of directional change through a series of levels. The previous
level, for example, might be considered as happening before the
appearance of modeFn man, over a hundred thousand years ago.
Dnergent evolution was fonnulated by Lloyd Morgan and
Samuel Alexander as an interpretation of the history of nature,
and to provide a way of interpreting biological evolution
without having recourse to mechanistic, vitalistic, reductionist
and prefonnationist ideas, and there is sane good sense in
Teilhard's isolating change into levels. Although evolution is
a continuous process, much of it is discontinuous with preceding
change/ •••
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change, often quite abrupt and sudden and rather con traryto
scientific reason. Such a realisation as this undoubtedly
pranpted J.B.S. Haldane to write, (1932), that "the doctrine of
emergence may conceivably be true, but it is radically opposed
to the spirit of science." In other words, discontinuity lies
within continuity.
With the above in view, palaeontologists are not always
baffled by existing "gaps" in hominid evolution, because the
continuity is still obviously there and further research has the
potential to elucidate many controversial problems. As J.B.S.
Haldane succinctly observed, "The universe is not only queerer
than we think but queerer than we can think." It must also be
appreciated that sane of our inability to appreciate the true
meaning of emergence in evolution, is because language has been
partly responsible. An example of this could be Darwin's early
use of the word "struggle" of evolution, with all the overtones
of such metaphors.
The recent discoveries of Leakey in Africa have given
evidence that the brain evolved gradually, and it has been
possible to put together a reasonable picture of evolution of
hominids since the widespread Australopithecine families of
about two and a . half million years ago. There are gaps, but
artefacts and the use of fire have been valuable indicators of
the nature of these near-ape-like creatures. Incidentally, the
Swanscombe skull found in Kent, and datect a quarter of a million
years ago, has mostly modern features, and the brain volume was
"human".
The argument as to whether Australopi thecines really
were/ •.•
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were man's ancestors of some two to three million years ago is
not a vital point. What is important is the development of the
brain "along the hominid line" of ape-hwnan creatures. In this
respect emphasis has been placed on the work and conclusions of
Tobias (1965), earlier referred to. Tobias asserts that there
is scarcely room for any doubt that Homo and Australophithecus
sterrmed from a comnon ancestry, despite the fact that there
remains a large morphological gap between Australopithecus
africanus and Homo erectus. Recently this morphological gap has
been filled in by an intermediary, Homo habilis, thus spanning
the last remaining major gap in the Pleistocene part of the
story of human evolution, as stated earlier. There still remain
gaps, however, such as the paucity of fossils from the Pliocene
Epoch previous to that of the Pleistocene, which so actively
featured the dawn of man.
Primi tive artifacts are useful guides to mental
evolution. Pebble tools were made in South Africa during the
period of the Australopithecines, as for example in what is
known as the Oldowan Culture of East Africa. Research by Tobias
can definitely establish t ha t if there is any doubt about this,
there is little doubt that Homo habilis of the Lower Pleistocene
and with a brain volume of about six hundred and ninety ml, was
the first hominid to make stone tools, indicating an early form
of genetically determined mental capacity at about a million and
a half years ago. Succeeding Homo erectus certainly made rather
good flints, had a rudimentary "language", divided tasks,
transferred embers from one si te to another in hide sacks and
made shelters, all with a brain capacity of about nine hundred
and fifty ml, and about half a million years ago. And so one
can conclude that mind had significantly emerged by that period.
y .... I
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The approximate stages of man's evolution, together with brain volume,
de termincd by palaeontologists at the sites uncovered, are presented
in the following table and represented below in the diagram. The
dating of the commencement of the cultural period is quoted as two
hundred to three hundred thousand years ago.
Species Years ago Brain volume
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It was, of course, later, at two hundred and fifty
thousand years ago, that Emergence really accelerated. Before ,
this time, the speed of man's evolution was not at all
flattering. Certainly the indication of the tools he left
behind him confirms this slow mental development, because as he
developed a still larger brain, there was scant evidence that he
was using it, or had need of it. Std Ll the forward march of
evolution went on evolving an ever greater neuronic centre as
though in preparation for the distant future, to witness
Neanderthal's even greater than modern man's brain, over fifty
thousand years ago. The brain actually advanced to the sapiens
level tens of thousands of years before it was much exploited
and of course mind could only Emerge rapidly when neuronic brain
was put to work as in the advanced cultural peri<Xl which did not
begin until the intellectual powers and the linguistic
competence of Homo sapiens had become well developed with
increased complexity of organisation and efficiency of working.
Julian Huxley has pointed out that "biological progress is
marked by the intensification and improvEment of mental capacity
and its results, in particular, knowledge and organisation of
lmowledge," that is, life is constantly leading into regions ·of
new evolutionary possibilities.
Whatever the heights to which Homo evolves, life to-day
and in the future is no less a miracle than it was in
Pre-Cambrian times when those first organic molecules began to
stir of their out: accord. Not even when mind began to Emerge, a
phenomenon Spinoza termed "an infinite attribute of nature," was
there a greater miracle than the first stirrings of the germ of
life which induced it to crawl out of the Mesozoic slime and
take/ ...
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take its rightful place on earth, eventually evolving into man,
classed by Teilhard as now the "spectator of evolution." (After
Emile Rideau, 1965).
Teilhard, the visionary philosopher-scientist, had an
inspired view of man and his relation to the cosmos , He was
well aware of the "creative current" underlying evolution which
dictated the conduct of organisms vested with life and
controlled by a pre-existing order in what is known as the
"natural Information store" built into living things.
Nevertheless, there are innumerable examples of failure to meet
the challenge of the environment, a classical example being the
dinosauria, a group of animals, often of imnense size, which
suffered extinction due to natural causes. On the other hand,
the tortoise with the special protection of its shell and
relatively low adult mortality, continues to plod on from the
Peimian.
It is believed that, right down to its organisation at
the molecular level, life retains an aura of mystery, which has ·
not ceased since the dawn of life. For example, some basic
features of man's structure to-day are traceable to extremely
remote times, as biologists know.
As is widely believed, living things do have the purpose
and aim to survive, in fact, a fundamental characteristic common
to all living things. Moreover, this is achieved with an
efficiency rarely approached in any man~ade machine, and by an
apparatus entirely logical. This efficiency is traceable to
reference standards in the brain, but appears to go further than
that/ •••
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that, with the possibility that matter itself possesses
fundamental qualities, but allows these to pass naturally in
life. The Hellenic school of the Greek metaphysical pluralists
under Empedocles introduced the concept of the introduction of
change and rearrangement in the four basic substances in the
universe, though they (fire, air, water and earth) are
unchanging in themselves. This philosophy of change and
rearrangement in matter provided an orderly cosrms , the agent
being a rrovingforce, a well-accepted philosophy which remained
valid until the early eighteenth century. Aristotle actually
introduced the workd "entelechy", mind being the entelechy of
the body, which to-day is defined as the vi tal element that
controls and directs responses to stimuli.
A study of the dawn and advance of living things has its
fascination when it is realised that man is involved in it by
evolution. Unfortunately, for the student of evolution, there
are, for some unexplained reason, no vestiges of extinct life in
the hundreds of thousands of feet of Pre-Cambrian era of gloom
and murkiness on earth, a fact which has given rise to the
phrase "Pre-Cambrian riddle." It was as though nature wished
modesty to conceal the birth throes of its remarkable miracle
offspring. However, evidence has poured in since the middle of
the Cambrian, about five hundred and fifty million years ago,
numerous bodies of soft invertebrate animals being found, such
as those of worms. A pure guess has been given for the dawn of
living things which are definitely animal in nature, as a
thousand million years ago.
There must have been a stage in which plant life and
animal life were difficult to destinguish. A major distinction,
however,f··.
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however, is that plants can make organic chemicals, whereas
animal life cannot. Animals consume food, but cannot create it,
whereas plants can, from chlorophyll. What most surely is
amazing is that minute unicellular forms of life of a thousand
million or so years ago, brought into existence the first simple
animals. That these first forms of life were living animals
themselves is shown by the fact that most of them possessed the
means to move about by the use of a flagella-like appendage, not
altogether unique, however, because it is thought that some of
the higher plants may also have arisen f'ron flagella-equipped
. plants.
From single-eelled life there arose multi-eellular forms
of life,. the primitive sponges may be quoted in this respect.
This very . ancient animal group was present in the Lower
Cambrian period, showing that the evolution fran the protozoan
to metazoan forms of animal had taken place about six hundred
million years ago, not to mention other living bodies too soft
to leave fossilized traces. The Mid-Ordovican of about five
hundred million years ago, however, does present fossilized
impressions of many far more advanced higher-form descendants,
in what zoologists term "metazoan phyla." The Ordovican, also,
produced many and diverse preserved sea shells, with gastropods
such as limpets, snails, slugs and so on, creatures actually now
breathing by means of rudimentary lung-like sacs.
In the succeeding several hundred million years, the
evolution of life was recorded in fossilised remains preserved
in the later Palaeozoic and early Mesozoic Eras. Primi tive
Triassic vertebrates were now swirrming in the early Mesozoic
seas/ •••
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seas. and in general living creatures were less remotely
connected to man through such features as a prtmitive brain and
a jointed backbone.
The various stages of fish evolution. in which the
changes in their bodies which they passed through. have largely
been stages which have taken place in land animals. those that
originally came out of the sea. As referred to earlier. much of
the structural pattern which we have in our own bodies. was
developed step by step in the evolution of fish, over a hundred
million years before the ini tial stages of the land invasion
began. by creatures that were essentially amphibians. By the
late Pennian and ·Early Triassic Periods of sane two hundred
million years ago, monsters had begun to take over the land
masses. Their ancestors had found that instead of thrusting
their heads out of water to obtain oxygen, it was more expedient
to learn to ~~de ashore.
And so life became divided between sea and land. The
tendency towards land-dwelling actually coomenced four hundred
million years ago in the Devonian Period. when fish began to
evolve lungs. Land in those geological ages must have been bare
and inhospitable, so Lt is dubious whether evolution of lungs
could have been an active "preparation" for land-dwelling,
though the course of evolution does remain a mystery on
occasion. It has been said in this respect, that the theory of
evolution actually becanes an uncertain force in the phenomenon
of amphibian evolution. Could it have been "foresight" into the
coming climatic changes in which great bodies of earth's surface
were commencing to dry up? It is indeed curious that there does
existj •••
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exist in living creatures to-day an unexplainable awareness of
coming changes in the natural environment. This is exhibited by
rats leaving man4nade constructions before disaster and barbel,
or large fresh water fish, leaving deltas and struggling
distances overland sometime before the advent of destructive
floods, which latter the writer himself has witnessed. Examples
of such premonitions are not uncommon in nature and old timers
shrug it off wi th the remark that "they know, tI though possibly
in the case of rats a special sensitivity to earth vibrations.
It is recorded that throughout the advance of
evolutionary history, vast natural upheavals and climatic
changes have occured with extensive effects, as for example
during ancient glaciations and climatic alterations. The cooler
and drier Miocene climate of about twenty five million years
ago, for .example, brought about the replacement of forest by
open grassy plains and savannas, which stimulated the evolution
of horses and other running animals. It is still debatable
whether the human line had diverged sufficiently from ape-like .
ancestry for climates of that time to have had a marked
influence on subsequent developments, since most of the
characteristics of Hano seen to have evolved well within the
Pleistocene Epoch, which carrnenced no more than about two
million years ago. It is known that the vast earth upheavals of
the Jurassic Period of one hundred or so million years ago,
actually extending over a period of about forty five million
years, laid low the bellicose life style of the dinosaurs.
Sirn1larly in the world of to-day, millions of years later, man
could seriously be threatened by radio-active fall-out, created
by/ •.•
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by himself and not by natural causes. The evolution of a highly
specialised brain has its dangers, with the problem "nowhere
else to go" the stark realisation that has to be faced up to.
The evolution from fish through to mammals is generally
regarded as a critical stage in evolutionary history, also the
evolution of primates in the Tertiary. Ewing has said (1985),
"There can be no question for a properly infonned person of
denying the evolutionary theory, but only of considering whether
it is adequate by itself to.explain the striking appearance of
design ••••••• without design the evolutionary process would
never get started at all. Nor,even granting that this miracle
had occurred, could the evolutionists claim that they had. been
al together successful in removing the antecedent improbability
of such an extensive adaptation as is in the fact shown by
experience. 11 Ewing further states that sane thinkers would
regard it as adequate to postulate an unconscious purpose to
explain design, but it is extraordinarily difficult to see what
such a thing as an unconscious purpose could be, and in fact
qui te unintelligible. All in all the argument fran .design is
supportive of a Creator organising and maintaining continuity
(homoeostasis), once the still imperfectly understood origin of
some organism, (that also had in itself the capacity to initiate
its own movements), had been set in motion, but is not
explainable by physical laws.
Young has stated (1978), that all men and wanen are apt
to demand explanations and meanings for life, but in this work
the/ ...
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the subject does not cane in for further speculation on
the nature of origins beyond the known and understood
facts of evolution, such as the wealth of evidence behind
the gradual evolution of man. When asked such a question
how did man possess such useful appendages as hands ,
Aristotle was reported to have replied, "It is because man
is the rrost intelligent animal that he has got hands."
It is not advisable to plague ourselves with
too many abstract questions. Lord Rutherford in fact once
observed, "Don It let me catch anyone talking about the
universe in my laboratory," and Julian Huxley is quoted as
remarking that evolution occurred "with no more purpose
than rain falling from the sky," and that seens a very
natural way of regarding evolution.
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Sunmary of Chapter One
This chapter discusses aspects of the dawn of life, with
emphasis on the direction life evolves in the case of man. In
this connection the expanding neuronal brain from that of the
earliest known man-like creatures to modern man is ex~plified.
There are hints that within this process of expansion
and emergence, there exists direction and purpose. In other
words, the eventual state of mental autonomy must have existed
in rUdimentary form from,the time of the very earliest hominids,
and to have continued through change over a considerable period
of 't ime;'
One is led to conclude that this emerging process,
particularly exemplified in the case of mind, has resulted from
the corresponding evolution in the brain of discrete patterns of
nerve cells taking place in a continuously enlarging brain
volume which is depicted in Figure 1.
-38-
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OlAIYrER TWO
ElfmJENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF OONSCIOUSNESS
AND SELF-OONSCIOUSNESS
Descartes is credited with initiating what modern
philosophy understands by the term .consciousness. The famous
Cogi to, ergo sum referred to a subjective tendency and had the
advantage of bringing out the absurdity of behaviourism as a
philosophy, that is, substituting the concept of behaviour as
explaining away mental events. Cogito established a permanent
subjective self according to Descartes, but all it really
establishes is the present existence of a thought or experience.
Had he used it as a starting point, m::xiern philosphy is of the-.
opinion he would have been on safer grounds, because what we
cogitate might be just a mental image of my imagination, such as
a unicorn.
With the theory of the emergence of mind, consciousness
is regarded as commencing in a rudimentary fashion far back in
the hominid line, even to Hano habilis with his near seven
hundred rnl brain being conscious of an enemy on the far side of
the hill, though he could not confion it right then with any of
his senses, but merely because he had earlier seen the enemy
approaching in that direction. As a matter of fact many animals
have this state of elementary consciousness, which has emerged
in the course of self-preservation, and is a very remote form of
Descartes' subjectivity , substantiating the theory that
consciousness goes back very far indeed in the evolutionary
scale. It would seen that inherited training of the brain
neurons has been an important factor in the development of
consciousness/ •••
-40-
consciousness in its non-subjective form. It could be mentioned
here that dispositions need not be conscious. For example,
anger could still be srrouldering in a man even though he has
forgotten it for the manent while enjoying a hunorous show.
Descartes regarded animals as "soulless machines ;" though he is
not always consistent on this issue (1983). Such beliefs are
speculative and any degree of fact can be claimed only through a
study of the implications of evolution. Teilhard himself was
convinced that the effects of consciousness go back a few
million years. He explains the fact that the kernel or Ego is
divisible and transmissible because there is some sort of psyche
in every particle which is at the same time associated with
infinitesimal centres of . the universe. This amounts to saying - .
that matter itself is involved in consciousness, otherwise the
material universe would be completely inert. J .B.S. Haldane
also believed that consciousness must be in matter.
It seems therefore that consciousness in its ultimate
meaning . is metaphysical. This is not unreasonable when we
believe that matter is likewise metaphysical, that is ultimately
so, or at the beginning. Therefore, life in any form moves '
along with consciousness in a mystical union. A further
mystical belief could be that man's relatively rapid brain
development thousands of years before he was able to use it to
much extent, · was in readiness for him to achieve that higher
stage of subjective consciousness and reach out to the cosmic,
which as de Chardin believes, has a primordial disposition.
Consciousness in general can be defined as the state of
a/ ...
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a person in which the brain-mind canplex allows experiencing
and thinking, and which abili ty has gradually emerged f ron the
primordial to the present high state of subjective awareness.
Merleau-Ponty believed in the essential subjectivity even of
time, that things surely existed and events took place before
there were any conscious beings, and the same may well be true
after conscious beings have ceased to exist (1962). Merleau-
Ponty states that there is no access to reality other than what
the mind reveals to us in consciousness. "Nothing will ever
bring hooe to my canprehension that nebula that no one sees
could possibly be, 11 Emphasising the primacy of the present and
of perception, and he further observes that time is a function
of our own consciousness, a philosophy which brings into focus
the place of body in our consciousness and what that makes
possible as regards our knowledge and understanding of others.
The very fact that we have conception of past, present and
future, is because of this subjective view of time.
It is maintained that the perpetual struggle to preserve
life against the dangers of the environment, needing cunning and
resourcefulness around the clock as it were, was a tremendous
incentive to the emergence of mind, which is defined as the
system of neural operations arising in the brain during
conscious experience. It has also to be pointed out that
observation also applies to activity other than physical, namely
on an a priori factor or organising activity without which there
would be no intelligible object, or thing-in-itself lying behind
the complex of phenomena constituting the nature of man (Kant).
The living of life is a natural process and the
occurrence/ •..
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occurrence of consciousness within that process an aid to its
effective struggle in promoting the ability to pursue that
struggle successfully. As will be observed further on,
subjectivity evolved later in the process of development of mind
is directed mostly to moral and aesthetic conceptions and is
very much less concerned with the harsh realities in the
"struggle" for existence, that is, a "sharpening of wits" by the
conscious surveillance qf the environment. Of interest is it to
note that consciousness, as claimed by sane researchers, is
asymmetrical, with the left hemisphere playing the greater role,
illustrating the theory that mind could have emerged fran the
neuronic structure of the brain. The left is believed to be
that concerned with verbal activity.
Consciousness of the dangers of the environment and the
need for that environment to support life, induced implemental
activity even as far back as the age of the Australopithecines,
and even earlier as observed by experiments with chimpanzees,
such as the use of leaves for drinking tools and other devices
in modifying natural objects. In other words the growth of a
primitive culture is closely associated with the emergence of
consciousness in mind, using culture as a non-verbalised system
of early tradition. In all this development, as outlined by
primatologists, a process of conscious learning is involved,
rather than genetic or instinctual, as Tobias believes, (1965),
implying that consciousness in its early stages has gradually
evolved collaterally with brain development. The odd feature
about such a claim, however, is that Neanderthalers of several
tens of thousands of years ago, had slightly larger brain volume
than man to-day, an explanation earlier offered that neuronal
connectivity is vital to the emergence of mind. Young states
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(1978) that if the brain has evolved slowly it seems likely that
human society, language and consciousness emerged gradually
too. It seems that for the Neanderthalers there was a "hold up"
in mental emergence, the bitter glaciation problems of that time
having a possible influence.
Heinrich Fal k (1967) quotes the official
Marxist-Lenini s t view of human consciousness as bei ng an
immaterial quality, an immaterial product and immaterial
function of the most highly organised matter, namely the human
brain, or more profoundly considered, the "inner condition of
matter." This contradiction of consciousness has also been
logically defended and regarded as a serious breakthrough in the
traditional position of materialistic monism. Thus, the fact
that consciousness, despite its qualities of immateriality and
spirituali ty , is nonetheless a "particular instance of, a
product and function of matter," that is, in its most highly
organised form of physical brain. Particularly important is
that Marxist Dialectic demonstrates the "ut t er superfluity of
the existence of God," the primacy of matter and its inherent
power in itself, not Creator given, and that spirit is really
liberated matter. This primacy of matter has the power of
autonarous self-motion and self-evolution to higher levels of
being without the need of any higher cause, a belief which seems
to be rather confused with entelechy, or Aristotle's term for
inner purpose in which God sees to it that matter everywhere is
internally formed, as for example mind over body and designed
for its respective objective. According to Aristotle, also,




Marxist materialism does not explain how the primacy of
matter is maintained, nor its power of an autonomous self~otion
and self-evolution to higher levels of being without the need of
any higher cause,rather like placing the cart before the horse,
or the blind leading the blind.
In the present work we are, however, more concerned with
temporal succession of phenomena rather than their causal
dependence. Such is an attitude between Marxist resolution of
consciousness, that is, consciousness emanating from matter (the
brain), and Teilhard 1s rather mystic claim that consciousness is
"likened to cosmic qualities which, to a certain extent, are
realised everywhere, and that every least corpuscle from the
beginning already possesses a "within", a centre of its
consistence, an "infinitesimal consciousness."
If one goes back to earlier philosophy, the German
philosopher, F.E. Beneke, called up psychology for an analysis
of complex mental experience, but mostly what that amounted to
was to fill the gaps that could not be explained by the free use
of the "unconscious, postulating a substantial mind, which
stands behind the facts of consciousness and controls and
arranges them."
In fairly modern times, unconsciousness was believed by
neurologists to be solely due to cerebral anaemia. On the other
hand, more recent research still has a very different view,
namely that there is somewhere in the brain~ind canplex "a kind
of switch blocking and unblocking awareness" (1979).
Consciousness/ •••
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Consciousness thus cannot be a property of neurons as such. It
was found that manipulation of the anterior wall of the third.
ventricle, that is, the central space in the brain, also had the
same all-{)r-nothing effect on consciousness. Tumours of the
thalamus, a group of cells at the centre of the brain, and the
hypothalamus, the region near the base of the brain for ensuring
homoeostasis, that is, the disposition of living things to
maintain a steady state in spite of changing conditions, such
tumours may also cause unconsci.ousness , possibly by indirect
effect.
The suggestion has also been made in neurology that
consciousness is a function of discharge patterns, rather than
discharges as such, suggesting an induced change in brain
rythms. A person can respond to a stimulus like bad news, but
faints only a split-second (less than half a second) later,
indicating that electrical brain connectivity through neurons is
responsible for the minute delay.
Another feature of loss of consciousness, is that it can
return slowly. Hypnotism also affects normal consciousness,
when man's awareness can be influenced into losing its structure
and a loss of "generalised reality orientation." We shift
forward on waking from sleep also, and slip back into it when
falling to sleep, both under nature's orders. In fact anything
which depresses the action of the cerebral hemispheres causes
defects of consciousness as well. The abovementioned hypnosis
is said to be really no more than an "altered" state of
unconsciousness and the mind remains in a "peculiar physical
state"/ •••
consciousness, a mixture of both consciousness and ,~V·_-j::'~ -
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state" and open to suggestion.
hypnotism, though the records
hypnotist.
Even SitiJIlund Freud took up
show he was a very poor
Consciousness is a state of the mind-brain complex
existing in varying . degree amongst animals and reaching its
highest in man with his capaci ty for self-awareness. The
implication is that it has evolved as an organised process of
brain activity and capable of subordinating neuronal activity.
Unconsciousness is the cutting off ·of this process by such means
as tampering with certain vital brain areas as indicated
earlier, or simply a blow on the head, or clinical means. The
abovementioned higher consciousness or self-awareness in man. is
regarded by some metaphysicians, such as Herbart and Lotze, as
still a substantial state, that is, a very real mind state, the
ideas which "cross" our consciousness being "the effects whereby
this real state preserves itself in its interaction with other
existences." The very unity of consciousness is also the fact
of the existence of a substance possessing definite ideas,
feelings and efforts.
Emergence of mind is due (not totally due) to the
evolution of neuronic brain which in its higher reaches became
capable of contemplating the aesthetic. In specifying not
totally due to physical brain, earlier comments on the
metaphysical nature of matter can be recalled, namely that it is
a word useful only in common speech as a general term for the
materials of the universe, of which in the present age physical
science has made a detailed analysis into ultimate particles and
forms of energy, with remarkable results. The other view is
that/ •••
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that mind has emerged fran matter, the critical breakthrough
being the rise of self-consciousness, as Teilhard states.
Should such be established by the intrcxiuction of some new
factor unknown presently to physics, an element of uncertainty
is introduced.
The difficulty in establishing any hypothesis concerning
mind, is that we are not aware of our own neurological
processes. They just happen, but the backing of the theory of
emergent evolution fran Australopithecines to contemporary man,
fortifies the belief that mental states have evo1.ved with the
evolution of countless millions of brain neurons. Eccles, while
clearly expressing the a priori factor of mind, also holds the
possible view of emergent interactionism of body~ind, and such
a belief is not based solely on causal connections.
Eccles restricts the use of the term mind to conscious
mind (1951), that is, in all its general operational field of
perceiving, thinking, willing; and only when there is a high
level of activity in the cortex, (as revealed by the
electroencephalogram), is liaison with mind possible. When this
is lowered as in concussion or sleep, unconsciousness
supervenes. This demonstration is of extreme interest and must
have similarly occurred in man even with his half-size brain, or
even less, when he was emerging fran an ape-like stage.
Sherrington believed that mind, (in his definition
conscious mind, is a non-sensual concept) has remained
unassimilable into the matter-energy system (1940), but as has
been pointed out earlier, this belief has frequently been
questioned/ •••
-48-
questioned by arguments which are largely speculative in
postulating a fundamental linkage. Eccles, later than
Sherrington's work, raised the interesting contention that mind
does enter into liaison with neuronic brain in special states of
the matter-energy system of the human cortex, though he remains
unsure of what happens in animals of a lower order than man.
For this liaison to function and work (as a detector), there
arises a sensitivity of a different kind frcm that of any
physical instrument. Eccles' hypothesis, therefore, is that
mind achieves liaison with the matter-energy system of brain by
exerting spatio-temporal fields of influence that become
effective through a unique detector function of the active
cerebral cortex. This cortex has been with man since the
beginning of his evolution, but as Alfred S. Raner of Harvard
observes, the further evolution of the cerebral hemispheres was
"the most spectacular story in ccmparative anatomy."
It is popular to refer to early man's inborn instinct, a
word which Young defines as vague and now little used by
biologists and a "dangerous concept," in fact. Rather should
our activities, including a part that is heredity, be referred
to as instinctive, or instructive ccmponents of behaviour,
though this is not entirely correct because a part of our
behaviour is learned, though it is still uncertain how such
learned patterns do work-in with heredity. The learning of
language is an example which involves such combination with
those basic patterns already produced by neuronic cells. Such a
capacity no doubt has beccme "second nature" since man evolved
into the full cultural age at least about two hundred thousand
year or more ago, whereas early man regularly began to employ
symbols/ •••
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symbols to indicate actions of other people to refer to
themselves. known as symbolic representation of the self. Of
course physical developnents also had to take place before
language could be expressed. such as the fonns of the pharynx
and palate as well as the tongue, which indicates that the
"capacitr' for speech began to evolve in the time of HOiX>
erectus, or even earlier.
To-day the brain of the new-porn child has such capacity
ready made. not only physiologically but mentally as well. In
this way the new-born very quickly gains a model of the outside
world before speech, In the course of growth this store of
knowledge is conserved in the brain and the picture the child
gains is transferred to himself as belonging to himself and he
becomes conscious of h~self and of his place in the world in a
very real way. Such a process resul ts in a person becoming an
entity to describe the outer world and in so doing finds he is
describing it as a self-entity of which he has become aware. it
is from the standpoint of this self-made self that he is able to
convey his thoughts and impressions of the world around.
The feeling of self-hood is one to which much importance
can be attached. even the word "ego" being considered
appropriate because it has acquired so many other connotations.
Nathan Leites in his book on the ego refers to the general
looseness with which this term is employed. Here we do not
refer the ego to Freuds' "executive function." but as the very
subjective self one's true identity of self-hood. which
basically is the product of neuronal patterns. an hypothesis
which is stressed frequently. and can even be denonstrated
by/ •••
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by the fact that methylene dioxyamphetamine is reported to
strengthen the ego or feeling that "I am I" and not because of
the weaker catholic inspired hypothesis of the disruption of
. sense.
F.Wing has dealt extensively with the conception of the
self and refers to the substance behind experiences as the Pure
Ego (1985), a state of which we are immediately aware, which may
be an unanalysable relation between our experiences and
doubtfully representing the quality of a substance itself, in
other words, not necessarily identifiable with its experiences.
Ewing points out that the problem is "one of the hardest in
philosophy. 11
Differences in expression of the basic self, such as in
personali ty, can possibly be justifiably accounted for by
heredity, learning and life's experiences in varying
environments.
When early man profited by prior experience and made it
a way of life he began to show intelligence, such as that of an
ape learning to rake food into his cage with a stick. This
capacity, if habitually exercised, could be inherited and become
a passed-down way of life. In the same manner consciousness or
suspicion of danger in certain situations, can be incorporated
into brain neurons as a hereditary factor, becoming more complex
and advanced as evol ution proceeded, continually providing the
evolutionary "back-up" of new capacities emerging. An example




an ape-like creature of the Tertiary that became adapted to
living conditions and all its dangers out on open grassy
savannas.
Eddington in "Science and the Unseen World" draws
attention to the mind's astonishing feat of deciphering the
stimuli transmitted along nerves, strange coded nerve signals,
into natural knowledge. If this is a feat beyond our
comprehension, how far less understandable is it that we should
comprehend what lies at the end of the nerve lines of
cannunication about the self. But we do know it, because the
self is the mind, the first and most direct thing in our
experience, knowledge of · which according to Eddington,
transcends the methods of phys~cs. For Eddington, also,
substance melts into shadow, and so remains an unknown quantity.
How less, therefore, can one hope to comprehend consciousness of
the self, illustrating the fact that it is from the side of
physics that the foundations of materialism have been most
seriously undermined. Matter to-day has become infinitely
mysterious and infinitely attenuated. We knpw a lot about the
physical world to-day, for example, how a thing functions, but
nevertheless not what such a thing really is. "If to-day,"
Eddington says, "you ask a physicist what he has finally made
out the ether or the electron to be, the answer will not be a
description in terms of billiard balls or fly~wheels or anything
concrete; .he will point instead to a number of symbols and a
set of mathematical equations which they satisfy."
How futile indeed does it consequently seen to attempt
to evaluate mind or self-consciousness. In view of the
physicist's revelations the sole course would be one of
agnosticsmj •••
-52-
agnosticsm concerning the nature of matter. But what of mind,
awareness, self-consciousness which belong to each and everyone
of us, even more so than matter? Science could treat the mind
as if it worked like a machine or a computer, as is currently
fashionable, but of course a philosopher would see the absurdity
of this, one of the primary reasons amongst many, being that
experience, has no identity and no consciousness ' of itself as
such. The sense of identity in itself is one of the most
enigmatic of all the phenomena of mind, or what William James
called it, the most "puzzling puzzle."
At present no attempt has been made to seek a definition
of consciousness beyond that it is the state of a person in
which the neuronic brain allows experiencing and thinking,
mainly the latter, since the only benefit philosophy can draw is
to point to the contingency and contentiousness of every man-
made theory and draw the epistimological, ethical, metaphysical
and logical conclusions.
One has to acknowledge that there exists an element of
mystery in the workings of nature, for example the greatest
mystery is the phenomenon of life itself and in particular that
of the human mind. That mystery remains even if it could be
conclusively shown (which it cannot) that it has evolved from
matter. Above such, another mystery exists, namely what is
matter? It is but a man-made concept of different meanings all
of which continue to be controversial.
Lonergan wrote, (1958), "One cannot deny that within the .
cogni tional act as it occurs, there is a factor element or
component/ •••
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component over and above its content, and this factor is what
differentiates cognition acts from unconscious occurrences. 11 By
consciousness, Lonergan means "an awareness irrmanent in
cognitional acts ," Another belief of his is that "conscrous
acts are not so many isolated, random atoms of knowing, but many
acts coalescing into a single known ,." indicating ' a single field
of consciousness.
William James was fond of the phrase "st.ream of
consciousness ll in defining mind. One can see, however, how this
fails when one notes the occurrence of states of
unconsciousness. If we assert that the "stream" continues
during states of unconsciousness, then one faces the problems
involved in the substance theory or pure-ego concept. Be it
recalled that Descartes view of the mind is that it is an
enduring, immaterial, non-extended thing that undergoes changes
consisting in the perfonnance of various acts of thinking.
Actually, the concept of mental substance in earlier
philosophies is rather unclear, as indeed many more recent
expositions on the nature and property of mind likewise suggest.
Fur-thermore even the brain is little understood despi te the
tremendous increase in our knowledge of how it works which has
been achieved by neurological experiments, such as removing
parts of the brain and stimulating directly parts of a conscious
patient's brain. The mind-body relationship, which r~ains such
an "acute di.sccmrort;'' to philosophers, will be reviewed later.
Goudge of Toronto University, believed that if such a study were
conducted in terms of the mental-neural network systems having
an array of functions , instead of in terms of mental substance
and physical events, a fresh approach could be achieved, though
he appears to overlook the fact that such a philosophy has
really / •••
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really been with us a long while. Bertrand Russell, (1948) did
try to work a philosophy in terms of science, but finally came
to the conclusion that the entire world of physical science was
a "speculative construction11 buiI t on the foundation of
consciousness.
One is inclined to believe that the whole issue involved
in mental emergence has become so complex that, in the words of
Scriven, "it is the creature i that is intelligent and not the
brain," which latter, science so assiduously studies.
Ewing (1985, loco cit. p. 110), states the possibility
of the distinction between two senses of "conscious" in order to
avoid confusions'. By "conscious desire" may be meant a "felt
desire," which means that all our experience need not be
conscious. For even the most introspective person is not
introspecting all the time, and when he does introspect he does
Ifot introspect every element of his experience. There is .always
sanething more beyond what we explicitly notice in our
introspections. It may therefore, without seJf-contradiction,
be supposed that we have desires which are felt as elanents in
our experience making their contribution to its whole tone, but
are not selected and identified consciously.
The idea that the past and the future (as far as it may
be surmised) leads to the concept of the distinction of temporal
form of consciousness (1984), (the past and the future being
secondary to the present for consciousness as we know it), is a
belief which is behind Merleau-Ponty's "primacy of the present."
The past is no longer "lived" through and the future may not
be/ .•.
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be lived at all. People with brain damage may have no memory to
live in the past, which after all is only done in a derived
sense. The real thing is consciousness only of the present.
Every psychic phenanenon in consciousness is an act
which refers to an object beyond its own consciousness, but the
object remains llnnanent in consciousness, for it is not merely a
target for which intentional awareness aims. There can, for
example, be no consciousness of hearing joy without some object
with which one can be joyous. The psychical phenomenon or act
is the secondary object, while the phencoenon to which it
refers, that which appears as if it were external to
consciousness, is .the primary object. Brentano in this way,
transferred significance fran the primary object to the
corresponding psychical act.
A definition of consciousness largely upheld by Husserl,
whose Phenomenology represents an extension and transformation
of Brentano's attempt to work out a logical geography of mental
concepts, is that it is a state housing the essences or
essential structures of phenanena represented or exhibited
therein. It is in the intentional act of consciousness that the
world acquires meaning and reality. Reality is disclosed
through the transcendental Ego within the realm of
consciousness. This amounts to saying that consciousness is a
state which determines objectivity of the external world, the
reality of which is not denied.
The view expressed in the present work is not that the
problems arising in the emergence of mental phenonena can be
understood/ •••
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understood by reference to orientation with neural activity.
The emerged mind has quite obviously reached a level
transcending analysable phenomena of neural tranformations, to a
level of mystery and obscurity. Nevertheless, it is believed
that the concept of emergence is needful to the whole concept of
the philosophy of mind, reasons for which this work attempts to
present.
Professionals bear testimony to the need for orientation
with neural research. Sir Henry Cohen for example, states
(1952) "there is no specific attribute or mode of functioning of
the "ghost" (Hyle) by which we can recognise its misdeeds •••
for there is no thought in man that cannot be disturbed or
destroyed by disturbance or destruction of the brain." On the
other hand, Cohen does caution further on, that such statements
as brain activity causes mental phenomena, could be senseless as
. a bald statement. Sherrington, also, is quick to remind us that
"the step frClr.l electrical disturbance in the brain to the mental
experience is the mystery it is," the mind adding the third
dimension when interpreting the two-dimensional picture (1940
loc. cit. p. 116).
Goudge, a supporter of orientation of emerging neuronal
brain with mental phenomena co-emerging, points out (1976) that
"a . long, complex process of organic evolution has occurred on
the planet resul ting in irrrnense changes in living things ••••
mental phenanena have undergone changes from simple to complex
and fran homogeneous to heterogeneous forms. Such changes
consti tute/ •••
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consti tute an essential feature of mental evolution. n Coudge
indeed goes further to quote proof of the fact that "mental
phenomena cannot exist in the absence of the functioning of
sense organs, nervous systems, and brains." There is, for
example, the recent discovery that a sub-cortical region of the
brain known as the brain-stem arousal system, plays an important
part in detennining mental activities in humans, and is al so
thought to account for some intellectual processes, and what is
significant is that this brain-stem region is phylogenetically
older than the cortical region and is a more "primitive"
stucture which man shares with other animals who appeared before
he did on the evolutionary stage. This adds support to the
possibility that mental phenomena occur in animals, whose
central nervous systems are a good deal simpler than the human
central nervous system, with corresponding simplicity in mental
_. phenomena.
The above points to the hypothesis that man's mental
processes existed in a less developed fOITn in such ancestral
beings as Australopi thecines or some collateral group. This
hypothesis is supported by Rensch in his book "Evolution Above
The Species Level" published in 1959, and also "Biophilosophy"
in 1971.
Taylor has outlined brain connectivity as follows (1979
loco cit. p 272), "There are six layers in the cortex, and even
six such networks have fantastic discriminatory and integrative
powers/ •••
-58-
powers, as von Foerster (Heinz von Foerster, Urbana, Illinois)
has shown. But in each of the six layers are many cells ranged
above one another. We should probably think, therefore, not of
regular layers but of numerous folia dissolving into one
another. And as the connections and thresholds shift,
functional networks will appear, expand, contract, join up,
separate and vanish within the structural network. That is a
concept of the brain of such power, of such potentiality as to
defeat the imagination. And when we elaborate it further with
the ideas of anelectrotonic conduction and magnetic fields, we
have an instrument which could well be capable of the intricate
ballet which we call human thought. 11
Is such a miracle of evolution capable of mind as well,
and how is such associated mind involved with neurons in the
brain? Eccles, has declared that "for every mental event there
is a unique brain state." Further, what is the relation between
consciousness and brain neurons? Does it not becane apparent
that in that centre in which Sherrington's "great multitudinous
creative dance," the brain, there is also the creativity ·of
mental events? Pribram, however suggests the possibility
(1969), that "nerve impulse patterns per se must be unavailable
to awareness."
The crucial area for consciousness appears to be the
swelling of the brain-stem, known as the pons, according to
Taylor (1979 loco ci t , p, 75), the pons as described by J .Z.
Young being the band of tissue below the cerebellum,
containing/ ..•
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containing many important groups of nerve. cells. Verification
of this possibility would confirm that mental processes do arise
in the brain; in fact Young categorically declares (1978 loco
sit. p, 193) that "Without a brain there is no thought." Later
in his publication, Young describes how the brain operates in
thinking (loc. cit. p, 204) "The process," he says, "involves
the motivations for search and exploration, including functions
of the frontal lobes, the perceptions of the sensory cortex, the
study of relations by the association cortex, and the
satisfaction of achievement, that are linked ultimately with
those life pranoting activi ties of the hypothalamus and
-
reticular system that are at the centre of consciousness."
The fact of centralisation of mental phenomena, such as
consciousness assymetrical with the left hemisphere as referred
to by Smith (1984), and musical stimulus with the right
hemisphere, suggests an intimate role of brain neurons in the
giving forth of mental phenomena.
Various experiences in the course of living bring
consciousness and awareness of the self into focus, as it were,
and is recognised by the fact that a child is not fully
developed until the age of seven years. The way it has been put
is that the child has to learn to describe himself as if
occupied by another person. me. Or to put it in another way,
the "world" as we describe it has a reality outside of
ourselves, and there is a form of "duality" established, me and
the outside world. Consciousness of the outside world in
htunans/ •••
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humans, even with the highly prepared brain, has to be
inculcated in the early stages of growth.
From the above, the implication is that consciousness is
an allied state of the brain and mental phenomena are caused by
sane event, the reverse not being true. The learning of the
young child indicates that the mental event (consciousness) came
after the brain event. This is by no means a new concept in
philiosophy. For example, as long ago as the publication of
"The Htr.lan Machine" in 1748, the French Philosopher, IJunettrie,
endowed matter with the power of acquiring motor force and
sensation, and of matter being able to "think", implying that
consciousness arose out of matter. His contemporary, Holbach,
presented the materialistic standpoint i.n a much stricter form :
by stating that mind is simply body regarded under the aspect of
certain functions and powers. The difference now held is that
matter evolved in its potential, and handed on in evolution
mental capacity, because in Pre-Cambrian times mental capaci ty
did not exist, whereas matter did. 'fuere did mental capacity
come fran? Surely through matter to mind, through neural
changes in the brain in the course of evolution. In the course
of time millions of years later consciousness and awareness of
the self became merged into the living cells of the body. This
view is further considered because there seems no logical
alternative to it, except the emergence of mind in matter, and
its enormous later deve.lopnent furthermore. In its higher
ranges it is this devel opnerrt which has distinguished persons
from the rest of nature, by persons meaning self-conscious, as
well as conscious, beings.
The/ •••
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The above does not imply that mental i tans are
"identical" with physical items, or that we can explain
everything that has to do with the so-cal Ied mental side of
human beings in terms of internal systems which have a certain
functional role in the economy that makes up that human being,
such systans having a purely physical realisation. The first of
these theories, that mental is just one version of the physical,
has given rise to currently fashionable materialism. The second
thesis is known as functionalism, also a currently fashionable
thesis among materialists, rather sutmerging personality, and
plunging man into uncertainty.
It is interesting to note that Teilhard de Chardin
maintained in his work "The Phenomenon of Man" in 1955, that all
constituents of the cosmos, from elementary particles to human
beings, have "a conscious inner face that everywhere duplicates
the material external." Goudge concludes (1967) from this, if
it can be substantiated, that physical evolution of the cosmic
stuff will at the same time be an evolution of consciousness.
The more highly integrated a material system, the more developed
its psychical interior will be. Thus in the human brain an
intense concentration, or "involution," of cells has led to the
emergence of sel f-conscfous thought, the most advanced stage
reached by evolution thus far. This evolved capability is so
unique that it moves into the realm of psychical phenomena.
According to Ayer (1982) the "psychic factor," which is assigned
an indeterminate status as between mind and matter,
is/ •••
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is credited with the power to enter into various compounds and
to carry the traces of previous experience. The possession of
it would not guarantee .personal survival, though it might
contribute towards it.
Quite possible i s it, that man's unaccountable and
relatively rapid evolution of brain capacity, gave him the lead
in acquiring the psychic factor, most likely as far back as the
late Pleistocene hominids, with their already superior brain.
Popular opinion would scarcely agree with crediting
consciousness to the .early Australopi thecine family, even less
any consciousness of the self. But the fact that they did make
tools, had an upright gait and had clubs, using the reasoning
capacity of a brain of four hundred and fifty m!' At the same
time, one has to consider that brain weight-gain is not a simple
happening relative to neural ability. An _elephant's brain is
three to four times larger than the human brain and a whale's
can :be stx :time's heavier. The fact is that the internal
complexity of the human brain is so much more exciting, with the
"silent" zones very little explored. "Within them," says Smith
1984 (loc. ct t , p.29), "lies most of mankind's wisdom,
imagination, forethought, compassion, and a very distinctive
lust for life, art, thought, invention and despair." The
.significant point is that all this arose from the elementary
nerve network which is traceable through fishes, amphibia,
reptiles, mammals to man, very suggestive of. evolution with a




The question may .very well be asked if man is unique in
this respect with his spectacular evolution of the human brain,
Sherrington's "enchanted loom,11 a phencxnenon which Groch
declares (1964), still to this day keeps its ability to think as
a "t.IghtIy kept secret," with a follow-up reference to the "long
and tantalising quest for the seat of mind," concealed among
such functions as memory, learning, Intell tgence, and rather too
fluently attributed to "activity" of brain cells. Ayer (1982
loco cit , P 186) nevertheless states that "there is strong
evidence that states ·of mind are causally dependent, in a .
. general way, upon states of the brain, in the sense that the
.operations of the brain are necessary for their existence."
Hume regarded mind as consisting of two kinds of
perceptions, those we call sensations, feelings, emotions
(impressions) and those called thinking (ideas). The former are
forceful and vivacious arid the latter nothing but fainter copies
of .t hese , such as images. The objects of our thoughts are
conditioned to what we have experienced or might experience by
inner feeling or inner senses. In tending to reduce everything
in the brain4mind complex to feelings, he escapes the mystery of
what consciousness . really is, . though there is a tie-up for
example with the phrase that conscious desire could readily mean
felt desire, as Ewing points out (1985 loco cit. p. 110). It
does not stipulate that all our experience must be conscious
(e.g. introspection/ •••
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(e .g, introspection or "unconscious desire") as against
experiencing desire, in which case Hume could be hot on the
trail of the nature of consciousness, even though none of his
important contentions is based on field work or experiment and
rather on appeals to what we already know. It is intriguing to
theorise how early and middle eighteenth century philosophers,
such as Hume, would have handled problems with contemporary
neuroscientific research to-hand, or with the perspective of
emergent evolution before them, bearing in mind of course,
Ayer's belief that philosophy itself has had indirectly an
important effect on the sciences. Science cannot take the place
of philosophy, but actually gives rise to philosophical
problems. It cannot even demonstrate ,though it must assume ,
.the very_ existence of the physical world, or whether the
universe has purpose. In fact Whitehead is reported as having
declared that "there can . be no successful democratic society
till general education conveys a philosophic outlook." (Ewing
loco cft ; p, 14).
As has been stated, the evolution of culture was gradual
and the product of a long evolutionary process linking modern
man with prote-human and pre-human ancestors millions of years
. ago (Goudge 1964). The progress towards culture, accelerated
increaSingly over the past two hundred thousand'years, indicates
that man was averse to sinking into indolence, and, secondly,
that the challenge for survival stirred him into ever more
sophisticated mental activity • This latter aspect no doubt
induced a IOOre sophisticated neuronal brain, and as stated
earlier/ •••
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earlier, with greater electro-chemical connectivity.
It is both the basic "urge" and the 11development ,lithe
former still shrouded in mystery, and the latter connected with
meeting the challenge of existence in human life-style, that
have evolved mental capacity and a realisation or consciousness
of the value of the self as an entity. In primitive times
indolent and incompetent people were eliminated, a fact which
promoted the forward move of society. This process of survival
of the fittest made it possible for heredity to pass on progress
in culture, and inculcate future generations with
ever-increasing cultural standards. This is more or less
Herbert . Spencer's approach to the pursui t of "general
happiness. 11 Later eVOlutionists regarded this development
philosophy as one of an "ape and tiger" tendency, T.H. Huxley
.. .
in particular, who was opposed to ruthless self-assertion.
Rather should society fit people to survive by correct education
and correct standards, so that cosmic processes can get on with
fundamental inner evolvement. In to-day's civilized world,
11struggle" and 11natural selection" are rather metaphors,
biological evolution being a silent process in which populations
undergo changes through certain complex statistically
represented sequences of natural events taking place within the
body and representing the earlier mentioned development process
and governed, as we must presume, by the "urge". Biologically,
this process is very slow, though mentally it has, during the
cultural age, been rapid. Ernst Mayr in his book "Animal
Species/ •••
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Species and Evolution," produced in 1963 and on page 656,. quotes
as an example the fact that Cro-~!agnon man of about thirty
thousand years ago," differs physically fron modern man no more
than do various modern races of man fran each other." In modern
culture? what has been of importance is primarily the result of
speech and man's ability to transmit non-genetic canponents.
But it is these which have hastened the sophisticated
development of the brain, particularly of its dendritic
connections. Sane of this ability does seem to consti tute
hereditary canponents, e .g, a "clever family", .but apparantly
not genius, which is often associated with prodigious memory.
One of the features of rapid cultural advancement -ha.s
been the fact, as Waddington contends, that each infant has
beccoe an "infonned acceptor," so that he will be ready to
- believe what he is told. This has becone more accentuated
since man began living together in small family groups. At the
same time, it has to be appreciated that man in this present
advanced cultural age, has · evolved the ability to si t in
judgement on himself and that involves his capacity for
self-a~areness, or the ability to think of himself as being in
the place of others, consciousness of individuali ty , in other
words. That was not possible in man squatting in the
evolutionary tree even in Later Pleistocene times, and yet even
geniuses like Mozart, Einstein, "inherited" their brains from a
long line of hunter-gatherers. It was the realisation of such a
brain's potential about a hundred thousand years ago, which has
brought/ •••
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brought man to his remarkable stage in which the brain is not
canparablewith anything else in the known universe, and the
surprising fact is that man is actually not aware of it as such
/
in any manifestation of consciousness, suggesting · the rather
curious definition that conscious is the state when the brain is
unaware of itself. This gives rise to observations such as that
raised by Taylor (1979, loco cit. p. 320) concerning the
peculiar "looseness of fit" between subjective experience and
the stimuli which give rise to such experience.
There are baffling quantitative aspects of consciousness
such as those induced by drugs, or even of awareness or
non-awareness of 'objects present by tricked lighting, or the
deflection of light passing through water or another medium of a
different density. The fact is that such illusions persist when
we lmow they don't exist, even feel they don't exist such as a
bent stick in water. We are conscious of the feeling that
sornethingpresents itself the illusory way it does, but
nevertheless aware that it is not so, suggesting that
consciousness of feelings and awareness are not the same thing.
The fact of the matter is that consciousness has to
arise somewhere, and neuroscientists have made numerous attempts
to locate it, such as those of Eccles, who maintains that it is
located in the topmost layer of the cortex. Others like Wilder
Penfield locate it in the brainstem or old part at the base of
the brain. Other researchers are, as Taylor quotes, Beri toff
( "Neural/ •••
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("Neural Mechanisms of Higher Vertebrate Behaviour," 1965) who
assigns it to the interneurons. R~er Sperry sees it as a
property of the brain circuitary as a whole, and so on.
The above disagreenent gives rise to the belief that
truth only can be arrived at, not by examining structure, but by
a study of consciousness itself. Electrophysiology has been on
the search now for about a century, without tangible success as
regards the seat of mental capacity, which still remains
invisible through all t he "brain windows" of neurological
research. Young's definition of the brain (1978, loco cit. p.
266) is a useful guide, namely that it is "a set of nerve cells
of imnense complexi ty whose intense activi ty is continually
directed to furthering the life of a particular individual," and
for each of us there is a continuous mental flow of experience
that we call mental life, or mind. How these two, brain and
mind, are thought to relate will be further discussed later.
Our main concern at the moment is and has been to discuss the
problem, for it really isa problem, in relation to the
emergence of mind through evolution, in the hope that this
approach will add slightly fresh meaning to one of the greatest
mysteries facing philosophy and science. It is merely to this
approach, that reference is made, because sufficient is known
about the problem that evolution in itself is no more than a
study of genetic changes in-populations by natural selection and
. the provision of basic information to survive. SPeCifically in
the case of brain it claims no more than to trace the physical
dimensions of this organ, · the hypothesis arising from this,
being/ •••
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being that the still not .unders tood facUlty of mental capacity
emerged together with the evolution and development of the
efficiency of neuronic brain, and, most important, mental
activity has not been an acquisition without a history. It is
hoped that such an approach may lead to deeper convictions than
those presented by much contemporary speculation not based on
historical facts in evolution, though they are instructive.
The idea about the concept of evolution dates back many
centuries. "Science in its beginnings," says Bertrand Russell
in "The Scientific Outlook", "was due to men who were in love
with the world," and that is true of the early Greeks. Their
broadness of vision was remarkable, though only given expression
. often in very general terms, for example that of consciousness
as being "everything that is condensed or rarified"air", and the
clouds ·areone of the first results of the condensation of air,"
a saying of Diogenes, who revived the theory of Anaximenes
(1928), the Ionian philosopher of about six hundred B.C. Of
course, Anaximenes believed the earth itself was a flat disc
floating on air. He did believe, however, there was a tilt to
the disc, a premonition of the inclination of the axis of the
earth.
Hundreds of years later the opinion retained was that
evolution was the way God's design works out, and that for such
evolution as that of God's design could not have got .st ar t ed at
all unless some original organisms already existed. (Ewing1985,
loco cit. p. 228).
Mind/ •••
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Mind, having relationship with physical brain, also
emerged gradually, even within the early stages of cultural
evolution. The discovery of the Swanscombe skull in Kent, dated
two hundred and fifty thousand years ago, had mostly modern
features and a brain volume equal to that of modern man (Young
1978, loco cit. p. 3~). Neanderthal man, who existed about one
hundred and eighty thousand years later, and even after that
intervening space of time, with a completely modern-sized brain,
was a very doubtful speaker. Lieberman (1971) demonstrated that
the fonns of the pharynx and palate were more ape-like than
man-like. The use of language was rendered possible by
.evolution of physical fonns which accompanied the evolution of
speech, such as the above4nentioned physical developments~ also
the lengthening of the pharynx and the more posterior position
of the tongue (Young 1978, loco cit. p. 186), adustments
required in addition to the development of neuronal brain
connectivity.
The production of cave drawings or artistry dating back
to Cro-Magnon times of thir-ty to forty thousand years ago, may
be regarded as evidence of a form of self-extension and
selr-consctousness of "me-and-you;" as in hunting scenes.
In connection with the alternation of structures, as for
speech, there are some that. ' are replaced, but not dispensed
with, there being merely a transfer of functions from older to
newer structures, but the older structures, as in the case of
the thalamus, a group of cells at the centre of the brain, are
still/ •••
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still there, though this centre, for example, no longer handles
vision which latter is now the responsibility of the cortex
(Taylor 1979, loc. ci t , P 109). It is therefore to be noted
that the added refinements of evolution are often "on-call" and
are probably going on within man this very day.
Consciousness from all that has been said in the
foregoing, is equated with physical evolution and even mental
"structures" are superseded but not replaced. Higher levels of
consciousness are inhibited -by drugs or damage or even
self-inhibition, while the lower levels rema~n functional, which
recalls the theory of the biologist, Ernst Haeckel, that all
creatures recapitulate their evolutionary history under certain
conditions. There are in fact those somewhat stern reminders of
man's evolutionary . past in noting how human embryos develop
rudimentary gills · at one stage in the wanb. Why, therefore,
some may ask, should consciousness not also have a "past"? For
. human babies the fulcrum of its life is in the limbic systems,
the older part of the brain, and when the higher parts are
destroyed or removed, rather primitive emotions take their place
(Taylor, loc. cit. p, 286) • Such behaviour is sanetimes
referred to as schizophrenia when it becanes a disease. In such
cases, a person becomes conscious of being manipulated by malign
outside forces (Young, loco cit. p. 167).
A general objection to the co-<ievelopment of physical
and mental by evolution, is the possibility of the assumption
that/ •••
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that mental phenomena may be subordinate to somatic phenomena.
On the other hand, no one considers the delicate scent of the
rose subordinate to the stem. The connection between physical
and mental is extremely binding and inttmate, as for example the
part played by the brain-stem arousal system in detennining
mental activities in humans, even though it is regarded as a
primitive structure. Furthermore, it is doubtful if any mental
phenomena arise without the pre-occurrence of a series of
electrical and chemical events within the neurons of the brain.
Sherrington's "shower of little electrical leaks" conjures up
mental events in a manner which still remains a deep mystery,
without any hypothesis whatsoever of our understanding of the
.subsequent "intervention" of consciousness, either of events or
of -the self. But one fact remains, that brain is pre-requisite
to self-awareness, a very profound hypothesis.
Young states very simply that mental states are those in
which physical brain "allows" experiencing and thinking (1978
loco cit. p. 291). It is felt that attempting to establish the
ground of the mental world entirely on Sherrington's "electrical
and chemical leaks," not only destroys personality, but is
one-dimensional and denies the "inner convictions" of the mental
world. Eddington stated that uncertainty exists only in nature,
not In the mind.
Ayer states (1982, loco cit. p. 36) that mind and matter
are differentiated by the fact that : certain elements such as
images and feelings enter into the constitution of minds, also
by the operation of different causal laws, the latter
corresponding supposedly, to Russell's logical constructions.
Moore 's/ ....
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Hoore's common sense philosophy states that some animals
other than man have what he calls perfonnance of "acts of
consciousness" ("Sane Main Problems of Philosophy", 1953)
located in the body and dependent on than, surely an example of
radical anpiricism, by assuming until further knowledge is
available in the case . of animals, there is no reason, in the
Humean sense, to assume sanething one cannot confinn or deny.
Broad ("The Mind and its Place in Nature" 1925, p ,
219-20) considered that mental elements reside not in the
sensing of the sensa, which consists rather in their being
brought into a suitable relation with the mass of body feeling,
but in the effects of past experience which leads us to convert
our sensings into particular perceptions, that is, to give the
apprehended sensum "a certain specific external reference." The
existence of "sufficient similarity" in the sensa presented to
different persons leads to a concordance of their behaviour,
though sensa in general are private to persons.
There are in philosophy a number of what Ayer call s
"dark sayings," and even Collingwood is not excluded when he is
reported as saying in connection with self-knowledge (mental
capaci ty). "Not a part of man, but the :whole of man is mind in
so far as he approaches the problem of self-knowledge by
expanding and clarifying the data of reflection. 11 (liThe New
Leviathan,", 1942, p, 11). Locke, on the other hand. struck a
more convincing note when he said that to imprint anything on
the mind vithout the mind being able to detect it through the
senses seemed "hardly intelligible."
In/•••
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In the history of evolution it would surely be
shortsighted to maintain that the neuronic network of the brain
evolved as a device solely for attaining consciousness. Nature
achieves very little without reason and one must assume that the
state of consciousness evolved as a means of preserving
existence in a more canpeti tive environment. Such a state
continuing into the noosphere or fourth stage (Figure 2, page
75), evolved into organised and unorganised functions or fifth
stage of emergence. Organised functions of the mind gave rise
to general awareness of inner experience and finally in the
seventh stage, to self awareness or purely mental entities in
association with disembodied existence. It is difficul t to
visualise the emergence of some - substance beyond personal
experience and still able to retain some form of identity. If
there is such a state as the pure Ego, .it cannot be applied to
physical substance, hence emergence into the seventh phase
(Figure 2) must be regarded as complete severence with matter,
that is of a completely different dimension. The point is that
emergence _of mind carrnenced as a means for survival in an
environment hostile and destructive to those unable to meet the
challenge when not 'with the mental capacity to do so, for
example such as inventiveness, reason and so forth. Primitive
people had to invent animal traps, prepare artefacts, work out
devices and means to outwit wild game, all featured in the third






















so ago, have a "soul"? According to the theory of Emergence,
disembodied existence emerged as a natural process through and
from matter over many millions of years, the seventh stage being
an "awareness" of this stage and a metaphysical yearning for its
attafrment , Aristotle's conception of the soul was that of a
device for explaining what makes sanething alive. For him,
therefore, even plants have souls, in the sense that they have
the capacity for growth. The theory that is advanced here
follows more or less along those lines, except that this force
or capacity for Emergence evolved in "thrust" in its higher
stages. Plato tends to think of the soul as the real self which
may survive the body and thus be imnortal, but curiously in
those early times of philosophy, there was little place for the
conception of mind as sanething inner and to be contrasted with
the so-called external world. (See D.W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics, p ,
163). There is no word in Greek that explicitly means
"consciousness" or no word for "mental" that has a connected
connotation, according to Hamlyn. Such was possibly due to
doubt and uncertainty of things, sufficient to bring into
contrast outer-inner speculations in .philosophy • Descartes,
however, had no difficul ty in being explicit about the
conception of the mental or inner state to which we have private
and privileged access. Since then, philosophy has pursued the
problem vigorously, with, however, attention being seldom given
to the theory of Emergence, which draws attention to the
importance of a natural sequence in the emergence of
consciousness through and from matter, even though this doctrine
has been before the philosophical world for about three quarters
of a century as a study of the history of nature as well as
speculative cosmogony.
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With reference to the seven stages presented in the
diagram. it goes without saying that each level is .who l l y
integrated. in the same way that the various levels are
presented by Lloyd Morgan , Oppenheim and Putnam in 1958, and Sam
Alexander and others. The distinguishing of stages has to be
regarded and accepted, with what Lloyd Morgan and Alexander
mutually agreed was one of "natural piety." In general, what
has been considered, is the creative advance of nature in time.
As Goudge pOints out (1965), biological evolution has given rise
to innumerable new types of living things, together with the
complexity of their "internal architecture." Whether there are
a series of mutations or a large one such as that which
introduced the placental animals at the start of the Tertiary
period some fifty rndllion years ago, when the first monkeys and
apes appeared, does not detach from the fundamental continuity
of emergence. There have been critical thresholds and many
inferences necessarily vague, but all in all the doctrine of
emergence is a fairly valid description of the history and
progress of living things. As far as the emergence of mind is
concerned. the indisputable feature is the expansion of the
brain, accanpanied by increased ccxnplexity. Added to this is
the fact that, throughout advancement, ' even to the highly
sophisticated stage in man. there is a natural link-up between
the physical and the mental even though the pace of change has
been erratic at times. In the main, evolution has favoured
brain development, with mind emergence sequential.
It/ ...
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It is obvious that the bits and pieces of molecular
hardware in the structure of the brain could not have of
themselves produced such mental states as consciousness, and it
is the unknown factor of synthesis in the third stage, as
presented in the diagram, that- gives rise to problens , The
problem is freely solved by some, pointing out that the brain is
not a canputer but a "Living thing."
Berkeley is quite unhesitant in postulating divine
arbi trariness, even declaring that without God the objects of
experience would not exist in the first place, eclipsing the
real problen which is how or why these things should happen.
Berekely accepts the Emergence of mind out of life, of life out
of matter and matter out of space-time simply as contingent
matters of fact.
In more recent philosophy, there has been further
"analytic" approach to the problan, Whitehead, for example,
vividly realised and described the resemblances, the fundamental
continuity, running all through . the world of nature, fran its
most rudimentary forms in the electron and proton, .and to its
highest emergence in the mental life of man. The physical
universe is after all finite in space, and probably in time, and
finding a direct role for God becomes more and more difficult,
though it ~as not so to Berkeley and, incidentally, to Teilhard
de Chardin in the present age. Nevertheless, those competent to
evaluate natural science, such as Alexander, rather tend to
posi tivism in arguing that natural science provides the only
valid form of thought.
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As far as life on this planet is concerned, Young points
out (1978, loco ci t , p. 34) "that there is much evidence that
all the living things on earth had one ccmnon origin," for
instance all using the same DNA code and similar amino acids.
Natural science can reach down to the origin, but it cannot do
the same for the "drive" behind lif~, beyond evolving
self-maintaining systems in the laboratory, "little drops of
jelly" as they have been described.
Exploring the highest levels of mental life is surely
the task of metaphysics, a discipline that dates back far in the
history of philosophy, in fact a title of Aristotle's works
about the ancient world, though in Aristotle there is overlap
with physics. Aristotle was nevertheless clear that what he
meant by metaphysics was knowledge of natural bodies, living
things and so on, which, in effect, is not so different from the
aim of metaphysics to--day. Aristotle I s ontology deal t with
essences and in terms of those he did know.
In this study we canmenced wi th an outline of mental
capacity as "inhabi t ing" brain neurons without offering any
explanation beyond that mental capacity must" have originated
somewhere and that the "most likely" origin was in the brain,
without attempting to enlarge on what actually constitutes mind.
The problem is evaded after outlining mind's emergence in
evolution. But with further sophistication of mental capacity
one is pressed to enquire what "entity" is associated with
periods of awareness. Clearly it has no physical dimension, and
is conveniently used as a description of the general mode of
operationl •..
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operation of the brain. Such a vague concept, even more
complicated by the fact that as Young says (1978, loco cit. p.
216) each of us has as it were, two minds "with distinct
capaci ties, fI on the right and left sides of the brain. For
example, a person may be good at mathematics with his left side,
but a poor artist on his right. However, fortunately, the whole
complicated system is, as Young points out, controlled by one
central reticular system and produces in each of us a single
stream of consciousness, and from mcment to moment a single
entity, the self, has to make decisions about the future course
of action upon which life depends, such as for example embarking
on a highly hazardous rock climb.
Here then, on the authority of Young, we have the
assurance that consciousness is a single stream specific to each
individual, with the implication that as a single stream of
energy it reaches up into the seventh stage (Figure 2). Hamlyn
(1984, loc. cit. p. 8) states that his own approach to
metaphysics is to say that "it is concerned to set out in the
most general and abstract terns what must hold good of conscious
beings and .the world in which they live if that world is to
constitute reality for them." Such a statement should hold good
also .for any speculation referrring to life beyond the
energy-stage of the noosphere.
Individuals do have thoughts and feelings of which they
may not immediately be aware. That vague tern instinct, little
used/ •••
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used by biologists to-day, refers to inherited and not learned
behaviour called-up when required, as in self-preservation,
suggesting that its origip may be in some primitive area such as
the brain-stem, which evolved before the cortex. On the other
hand, it has to be appreciated that consciousness, for example,
can depend on an elaborate structure in man to-day. Parts of
consciousness have been demonstrated as having been lost by
damage to parts of· the brain, clearly indicating that the source
of consciousness is not relegated to any specf.ftc part of the
brain. Suggestions have been made that it exists in the many
millions of brain neurons as a built-in feature in which somatic
state consciousness and awareness are natural phenomena
partaking in evolution. This is not an unreasonable theory,
falling in line as it does with the theory of the emergence of
rrdnd in evolution.
It is interesting to note how neurologists have differed
in their opinion of the location of consciousness. It will be
recalled that Eccles believed it to be at an area in the topmost
layer of the cortex, that is the sheet of nerve cells and fibres
that occupies the top of the brain, and each neuron in its
receptive area, according to Young (1978, loco cit. p, 290),
represents some external feature, and those of its motor areas
representing movements of muscles. As stated earlier, Wilder
Penfield located consciousness in the brain-stem or old brain ,
Beritoff" the Russian neurophysiologist, assigned it to
interneurons, while Sperry regarded it as a property of the
brain circuitary as a whole. Sperry's hypothesis would appear
more/ •••
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more conformable with emergence, since consciousness is a state
which the whole brain gives rise to during experiencing and
thinking. Sperry definitely claims that consciousness is an
emergent (See Taylor 1979, p , 72). Sperry specialised on
hemisphere disconnection and in 1966 wrote (See Taylor. p. 126),
"The evidence suggests that consciousness runs in parallel in
both the hemispheres . of the split brain person," which was
unwelcome to dualists since it appeared to rule out the
existence of a soul. Young has pointed out (1978 loco cit, p.
216) that further information should allow us to replace the
single concept of mind and mental activity, which includes'
consciousness, by other concepts more fully descriptive of... the
modes of action of brain processes, even though, as stated
earlier, there results a single stream of consciousness,
embodying "felt" feelings and feelings which we have to "dig
out" by Irrtrospectton , Ewing states that there is always the
sense of "sanething more" even beyond what we explicitly notice
in our introspections (1985, loco cit. p. 110).
A factor which may be considered as having a bearing on
the phenomenon of consciousness is the organisation of brain
proteins. Taylor quotes the researches of Lance Whyte (1979,
loco cit. p , 45) whose book "Internal Factors in Evolution"
offers the hypothesis that proteins within the mass of neural
cytoplasm become oriented in the direction of electron flow and
so emit mental activi ty, which boils down to molecular activi ty
in the brain, and states further that some of the
phenanena which at present we find so mysterious could be
accounted/ •••
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accounted for by the hitherto not understood ramifications of
the orientated proteins. In connection with this, are the
rather fanciful theories of some researchers that brain
chemicals may even create emotion, which if correct could augur
well for treat~ent of mental illness.
These are interesting speculations, but the fact of the
matter is that mental activities continue to defy our
understanding, particularly in respect of brain4TIind
relationship, or as depicted in Figure 2, lithe unknown factor
of synthesis."
Nevertheless, the . capacity to be conscious evolved
naturally with brain evolution, which indicates that such
capacity evolved gradually as an awakening process within
emergent evolution in an incredibly complex brain. It is said
that each cubic inch of the cerebral cortex alone carries with
it more than ten thousand miles of nerve fibres connecting the
cells together, and rrore than a million nerve fibres run from
the eye to the brain, indicating how prodigal nature is. (See
Taylor, 1979, loco cit. p. 41). In addition to these
astronanical figures, every neuron is influenced directly by
hundreds of thousands of other neurons, and in several different
ways.
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there has been no breakthrough. but research continues. as it
will always do when a challenge is presented. and in this
respect there are various approaches to the problen, such as
that proposed by William James that there are potenttal "forms"
of consciousness. all entirely different. a philosophy which is
in line with his pluralism and an .attenpt to expand on hi s
belief in the imnediate experience of the self's activity.
Except for his view of the primal stuff as pure experience.
James disliked abstract thinking. such as declarings on the
unity of the universe. because actually in practice. that is, in
direct experience. discontinuity exists. James' functional
psychology nevertheless is dynamic, dananding his right to live,
right to believe, as for example man's right to believe in God.
As regards consciousness, he found no objection to regarding it
as a function of the brain•
. The implications fran James' psychology are that mind
and matter were both logical constructions out of primi tive
elenents which were themselves neither mental nor physical. with
such elements as images and feelings entering into the
constitution of minds, and thus helping to constitute minds.
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consciousness has gradually been acquired.
Of· interest is Teilhards' s question, "Is consciousness
solely a property of matter, seeing it cannot be localised in
the universe?" The problem becomes deeply complex and the best
one can say in this respect is that in humans it is the specific
effect of "organised complexity," just as evolutionary advance
presupposes purpose, and one must agree with Teilhard that there
is some sort of psyche in every particle of matter giving rise
to infinitesimal psychic centres in the universe. Fortunately
for man, the brain has evolved as a monitoring and' organising
device, the capacity and inmensi ty of which man is not fully
aware, . or ever brought into the focus of consciousness by the
fact of inadequate knowledge.
Philosophical knowledge, also, depends on the division
between realists and idealists, absolute and relativistic
theories of truth, that is whether what is said is independent
of relationship to ourselves or otherwise. The other division
assessing oUr capacity for knowledge is between rationalists and
empericists. In the first case the philosopher may lean too
heavily on the security of the natural sciences, which, in the
light of further experience, can alter. E1npericists, on the
other hand, state that irrmediate objects we sense are ideas,
which severs real things from existence by pI unging them into
mental states or entities. What we know or see are only known
to us by inference. Bertrand Russell rejected such a
philosophy/ •••
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philosophy of private experiences, but at the same time in a
rather complicated form of reasoning claimed that mental events
are identical with physical states in the brain, but as Ayer
states (1982, loco cit. p, 38), how exactly he came to such a
conclusion is not clear.
In epistanology there are so many conflicting opinions
about what exists and what happens in the world around us, the
difference between having knowledge of sonething in the world
and merely having a fallible opinion, that one cannot be sure
such knowledge is believing or even guessing. Knowledge at its
peak, according to Urmson (1983), as opposed to guesswork and
opinion, is to be found where the sciences at their peak are to
'be found. What is known to sane and is in principle knowable to
all, is any body of truths conclusively established by the
rigorous methods of true science, because they use "pure
thought," not vitiated by the deliveries of the senses. Holders
of this view are strictly rationalists and' the weakness is that
over-rationalism may lead to abstractions, and it seems
justifiable that what is required in the quest for knowledge is
a "bit of each," both sentience and reason.
-87-
Summary of Chapter Two
The foregoing chapter is a philosophic discussion on the
occurrence and features of consciousness, presented in the light
of its anergence in man, life moving forward in what may be
described as a mysterious union with consciousness.
This union brings about, with further evolution of man t
a : degree of spectal i.sation in the individual , such as
self-consciousness and self-awareness.
An emergence of this nature could not have arisen by
chance and is accounted for by the age-old metaphysical concept
of potential in original matter. This Emergence of potential
exists within nature's design to enable man to contend and
defend his existence in the natural environment. In this
respect consciousness is not a chance phenomenon, having been
first provided for by the evolution of neural structure in the
brain.
. In all this process of Emergence, man has becane aware
of his selfness over the long period of evolution fran early
Australopithecus and with such emergence he has become canpetent
to rationalise and argue on his own . destiny and place in the
order of life on earth t the whole basis for this ability being
accounted for by the evolution of a remarkahle creation, the
brain.
The net result of the evolution of self-conscious
ability/ •••
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abili ty to think and plan refers to a unified and organised
functioning of the brain, known as the mind, which is likewise
within the plan for man's self-preservation.
-89-
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DIsaJSSION TOWARDS THE INTERPRETATION OF
MENTAL CAPACITY
The emergence of mental capacity is a theory ~ssociated
with long term trends in the evolution of the human species, but
these may often be very difficult to substantiate. Julian
Huxley states (1974), "The primary evidence canes from
continuous fossil series, but incanplete or even fragmentary
series may often be satisfactorily completed by the use of
indirect evidence f ron canparative anatomy and embryology, and
the indirect evidence may supplement the direct by showing us,
to a considerable degree of probability, with what physiology
and what behaviour to cloak the fossil bones. n Sir Juli.an goes
on to point out that the considerable majori ty of trends are
definitely adaptive, justifying the well-known fact that large
systematic groups usually contain representatives adapted to a
number of mutually exclusive ways of life.
There is also the problem of parallelism in mamnalian
evolution on the assumption that in each group numerous separate
lines of descent run parallel far back into geological time,
before divergence from a common ancestor can be postulated, each
group radiating out (adaptive radiation) to take possession of
different environments and so to develop differently and at
different rates. An example, probably in Pre-Tertiary times at
the end of the Cretaceous, is when seals and sea-lions branched




Sanetime during the Pliocene, about ten or so mill ion
years ago, Australopithecus began to split into Australopithecus
bosei and later subdivided again into two species, as shown by
Tobias (1965), while the main stem proceeded through the
Pliocene to consolidate as Homo habilis, having earlier taken a
chance to consolidate on t he ground as hominids during the end
of the Uiocene. There were stamped on him then, and continued
right through to modern man, indelible features such as molar
crowns. So it was during the later Miocene and early Pliocene
that great anthropoid apes came out of the security of their
forest habitat (1937).
The above very brief sketch is a reminder of how man has
arisen in evolution and become the sophisticated creature he is
to-day. Of course, as Julian Huxley emphasises (1974, loco cit.
p. 586), "Man is unique in having markedly reduced the impact of
natural selection on the survival of individuals by artificial
means, such as medical care and sanitation. The relative
importance of differential survival and differential
reproduct.ion has thus been completely reversed in most
present-day corrmunities. The human situation is so different
frem the biological thatit may prove best to abandon the
. attenpt to apply concepts like natural selection to nodern human
affairs."
This psychosocial transfonnation is important, as many
may wonder in view of the history of living things, what is
going on since the inception of the cultural period, which is
said/ •••
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said by some to date back some three hundred thousand years but
has been gaining momentum over the past nine thousand years or
more, and in fact is now proceeding at an alarming rate.
Through all the long period of primitive life, brain
evolution was still continuing, as though in preparation for a
time when, as Sir Henry Cohen puts it, there could be a more
efficient process of "liaison with mind" (1952).
Palaeontologists and biologists alike, stress such
emerged liaison, however, was gradual, dating back to its
beginnings early in the hominid line when certain connective
nerve tissues in the brain began to evolve.
Even though in recent times, natural selection is not
conspicuous, there can nevertheless be, according to Julian
Huxley (1974, loco cit. p. 588), change in gene-frequency which
may occur by chance, through random survival without the
intervention of selection. Biological research is highly
complex and the pressure of selection very much concealed, so
much so that man is not fully aware of its evolutionary force in
this psychosocial phase, the latter a term probably preferable
to "cultural" phase, although evolution in the psychosocial
phase is mainly cultural, manifested in cultural change, and
only secondarily genetic.
Darwin believed that his theory of evolution provided in
natural selection for a preservation of whatever benefits the
community/ •••
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ccmnunity contributes to the greatest happiness of the group,
though he made no deliberate effort to reconcile natural
selection with humanitarian ideas, as indeed Spencer did not
ei ther, though Darwin did believe that the general · happiness
does involve a "bitter struggle." Goudge states (1964) that it
remained for T.H. Huxley to "exhibit in a dramatic way the
conflict between Darwinism and decency in modern society," and
this is 'achieved by the individual repUdiating the gladiatorial
theory of existence , the ethical process not imitating the
cosmic process, still less in running away from it and denying
it, but in canbating it by the conviction that the cosmic
process has no sort of relation to moral ends.
Such a philosophy as the above seems to forget t he
difference between human evolution and pre-human evolution. The
same causal factors, in the first place, were not at work in
both periods, man's elaborate social traditions and practices of
the last fifty thousand years, transmitted through spoken and
written language, his tremendous ecological evolution, enabling
him, according to Ernst Mayr (1963) , to be capable of
"transmitting non-genetic canpononents of culture."
This may be wishful thinking. Does nature indeed permi t
any "new type" evolution? The whole process could in fact be
degenerative and inevitably lead to man's extinction through a
form of self-propelled progress ignoring the age-old elements
from which we have emerged and cannot biologically eliminate.
Nature ruthlessly goes on its own way, merely ensuring as best
as possible survival of a species. Julian Huxley states qui te
emphatically/ •••
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emphatically that no form of evolution does more than that, and
it is not a natural law to ensure progress or maximum advantage
"or any other ideal state of affairs." (loc. ci t , p, 466).
Natural selection brings types into existence, but in the grand
economy of nature it is also destructive, otherwise all the
well-known forms of life would go on existing. One might add
that if man observed natural developnent instead of going
against it by overreaching himsel f in the spirit of hubri s ,
things might work out differently.
Young states (1978) that there isa complicated and very
little understood relationship between organisms and their past
history and present environment. Nature does not place all her
cards on the table and for man to believe that he can "take
over" the direction of evolution may be presumptuous and
unpredictable. All psychosocial selection can do, involves so~
sort of selection between competing ideas and values, and
according to Julian Huxley (1974, loco cit. p. 613) "is clearly
very different from natural selection." Huxley also,
incidentally, draws attention to the fact that Teilhard
indicates trends for "future progress" in the existing
psychosocial period. In fact a significant question that
Teilhard does ask, according to his biographer (1965), is if
purpose is not in matter, how comes it to be present in man?
Because "some sort of psyche," which Teilhard sees in every
particle of matter, may not be inaccessible to the highest
reaches of man's mental developnent and, as thought, may so be
organised to bring about his eventual salvation.
In order to achieve what Julian Huxley terms a "unified
biological/ •••
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biological outlook," more than a classification and analysis of
evolutionary trends is required. Biologists and neurologists
alike find it imperative to explore the inner workings of living
units in the hope that a better knowledge results. Such
investigations are directed towards the effect of drugs and
chemiea1 agencies on the body and also the struc ture and
functioning of the body's "machinery." . For eX3II1ple, the study
of the effects of genes during developrent is known to be as
essential for an understanding of evolution as is the study of
mutation and selection. It stands to reason that evolutionary
progress, as consisting in a raising of the upper level of
biological efficiency, raises the challenge to research into how
that efficiency is evolved and maintained. Of interest, in
passing, is Julian Huxley's quotation of J.B.S. Haldane's use of
the word "progress" in evolution (1974, loe. ci t , p , 565), where
the latter writes, "I have been using such words as progress,
advance and degeneration, as I think one must in such a
discussion, but I am well aware that such terminology represents
rather a tendency of man to pa.t himself on the back than any
clear scientific thinking •••••• Man of to-day is probably an
extemely primitive and imperfect type of rational being. He is
a worse animal than the monkey •.•••• We must remember tha t
when we speak of progress in evolution we are already leaving
the relatively firm ground of scientific objectivity for the
shifting morass of human values." Wise words maybe, but
nevertheless it has to be born in mind that man is the latest
dominant type to be evolved, and furthermore values must surely
bel·••
-97-
be regarded as essential cri teria for future progress and have
only gained sane meaning since the beginning of the psychosocial
state. Few would refer such mental attributes to man half a
million years ago, even though he were as much involved in
evolutionary progress as at any time in the long history of
evolution.
Julian Huxley states (1974, loco cit , 572) that "in the
past, every major step in evolutionary progress has been
followed by an outburst of change • •••• '. Conscious and
conceptual thought is the latest step in life's progress. It is
in the perspective of evolution, a very recent one, having been
taken perhaps only one or two and certainly less than ten
million years ago. Al though already it has been the cause of
many and radical changes, its main effects are indubitably still
to come."
J~lian Huxley is of the opinion that any genetic changes
in the biologically near future must be sought in the
improvanent of the fundamental basis of human daninance - the
feeling, . thinking brain, and the nost important aspect of such
advance will be increased intelligence, implying greater
disinterestedness and fuller control of emotional impulse, which
fundamentally implies genetic changes.
Can man achieve such change through his own initiative




that suggested by Haldane in his work, Daedalus, (see Julian
Huxley, loco ci t , p, 573) as to reproduce our species solely
fran selected germina.I tissue-cultures? It would seen that of
prime Lmportance would be to genetically raise the brain's level
of performance in acuteness of perception, memory, synthetic
grasp and intQition, analytic capacity, mental energy, creative
power, balance, and judgement •
Julian Huxley refers to the possibili ty of further
developnent of telepathy and other extra-sensory activities of
mind. Higher ranges of aesthetic creation or appreciation or
pure intellectual construction, increasingly characterise man's
cultural advance and play a large part in human existence and of
course are of value in themselves.
Great steps have been taken in evolution over millions
of years, such as the rrove fran water to land of vertebrates and
the homothermy of mammals denanding the scrapping of scales for
hair, but more radical than any other has been the step to
conscious thought with the introduction of morality, pure
intellect, aesthetics and creative activity; and added to
that, the mental abili ty to consciously fonnulate val ues, not
solely visionary but to control and advance biological progress
as well.
In energent evolution one has to look backwards as well
as forwards in order to establish finn ground. After all
evolutionary/ •..
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evolutionary theory substantiates a recognition of the emergence
of subjectivity or "inwardness," maintaining even that it has
roots in the most elementary things, thus rounding-off into the
cul tural period the entire process in a long and inspiring
advance, and most important of all, not without purpose, though
to sane degree, "opportunistic ." Such a biologically based
philosophy does after all embrace the existentialist's concept
of freedom, freedom through emergence of mental capacity to
embrace it, all because nature has provided man with such mental
capacity. Nothingness existed befoie organic life on earth, and
emergent evolution has brought content and meaning into
existence and is still doing so. Jonas (1966) in his book on
the defence of an ama.lgamation of emergent evolution and some
categories of existentialism, states "there is no organism
without teleology and there is no teleology without inwardness,"
I
though at · times such claims could be construed as rather ·
mystical.
As observed earlier, man's advancing mental capacity is
keenly being explored by biologists and neurophysiologists.
There is, for example, Sherrington's classic research, stressing
the importance of the brain in transforming electrical charges
fran the sensory organs into the reality of a thing. In the
case of the eye, it is not the optic nerves, but the brain that
sees, with instant and decisive efficiency. It is that
cell-labyrinth, a veritable and almost infinite number of criss-
cross cells, that interests the neurophysicist, the not
understood/ •••
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understood mechanism in which these cells handle generated nerve
currents running to the brain (1955).
Cohen (1952) is confident that "sooner or later
electrical charges will be found associated with acts of
so-called "volition; and in general, it cannot, on physical
grounds, be regarded as impossible that with sufficient
knowledge a complete explanation of the electrical activities of
the brain might reveal what a person is thinking and, indeed,
might foretell his actions ." But the enigma still remains as to
how physical brain and psyche interact.
Russell Brain (1950) hazarded a guess that the power of
. the brain to "abstract," . is both physical and mental. "The word
"dog" may be uttered in different ways, seeing or spoken with
' di f f er i ng' pitch or intensi ty, yet it has a pattern which can be
."abstracted" in the same way that triangularity can be
abstracted. An appropriate stimulus might recall a pattern
otherwise ' l os t . "
Eccles (1951) suggests that the brain or cortex exhibits
a special property during consciousness, · entering into liaison
with the mind, having the property of a "detector" that has a
. sensitivity of a different kind from that of any physical
instrument. Mind achieves its liaison with the brain by exert-
ing spatia-temporal "fields of influence" that become effective
through this unique detector function of the active cerebral
cortex. An example of this hypothesis is the continuance of
mind/ •••
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mind when large portions of the brain are destroyed. In other
words. ECcles, in exploring the physico-chemical nature of the
organism, has found something which is not physico-chemi cal,
namely, mind or psyche.
It seems that many of the characteristics attributed to
the abstration "mind", must now be conceded as belonging to the
abstraction "brain", which fact anphasises that there is still a
serious lack of understanding in neurophysiology, in fact
ignorance, of what mind really is, and quite definitely it is
something very different fr~ any chemical or electricaJ actions
associated with it. It appears that mind must go on being an
independent reality for a long time, perhaps for ever, and that
what we come to interpret about the phenomenon is ' speculation,
bridging the gap between electro-chemical activity and so-called
output, possibly being, after all, a concept without any
founda tion in rea.l i.ty. No one in the first place can be sure,
as ' Young states (1978, loco cit. p, 271), that reference to
concepts of brain and mind is the answer, and thatit is not
impossible that the ghost is part of the machine after all!
As referred to earlier, Eccles prefers the term
conscious mdnd,that is a thinking mind, and as such is a fact
of experience, albeit a fact of individual experience, private
and restricted in nature. But by' ccmnunication they become
public and a part of the raw material upon which scientific
investigation may properly operate.
A/ •••
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A neurophysiologist, according to Eccles (1951, loco
cit. p, 56), would consider the synaptic knob (Figure 3)
as the key structure .on which 'mind influence' might work, there
being a mechanism in the active cortex that could effectively
amplify by thousands of times, minute effects exerted on the
individual synaptic knobs. When it is considered that one
square mm of neural tissue covers about fifty thousand
neurons, the inmense canplexity of neurological brain can be
well imagined by those who endeavour to explore it.
Taylor states (1979) that Sperry is definite that mind
can effect the brain as well as the ·reverse. The big question,
however, still remains and that is, how this activity comes
about in the ten thousand million-fold detectors that exist in
the cortex during consciousness.
In studying the brain many experiments are perfonned
with chemicals. Science has shown that, though the brain is
regarded primarily as an electrical switching device, there has
come ·i n recent years the realisation that it is also a complex
chemical system and it is quite recently that neurochemistry has
risen to prominence.
Borek in fact has gone as far as to state (1961) that,
"Every living creature is a chemical conglonerate 'exi st i ng











The main bodyof the TUUTone receives hundreds - in some cases thousands
- of z'np:lts from other neurones; some of them encourage it to respond,
others discourage it. Thus every neurone continuously takes decisions.
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middle of the nineteenth century when Friedrich WHhler had
synthesised urea twenty-two years earlier, that the importance
of chemicals in the life process of organisms really became '
known. Following on fran this was the chemical study of the
unit of structure of life, the living cell.
There are countless instances of the effect of chemicals
on brain ac~ivity and resultant mind. A well known fact is the
disturbance of mental activity accanpanying vitamin deficiency,
such as that resulting in pellagra, characterised by eruptions
on the skin followed by disorders of the digestive and nervous
systems. These symptoms are reported to disappear in pellagrins
When nicotinic . acid, (where absence is responsible for the
dd.sease) , is administered. Furthermore, an artificially
produced deficiency of biotin converts normal humans into cases
.. requiring psychoanalytical treatment. Likewise the source of
energy for the 'br ai n is the me~abolism of sugars, while deranged
enzyme systems in the brain result in temporarily deranged
personalities. Borek also quotes the case of where one
.
millionth of a grain of lysergic acid drug induce "transient
hallucinations mimicking a psychotic state" in a human. There
is strong evidence that schizophrenics have definite biochemical
aberrations from the normal.
To-day it is realised how impOrtant chemicals are in
giving rise to "thinking." For examp.le ; how are messages sent
across the gap which exists between the muscle and the end of
the nerve fibre, in which there is no direct contact whatsoever
betweenj •••
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Young (1978, loco cit. P 66) quotes the case of neurons
in the brain of a sea-hare producing a peptide whose injection
into another animal induces egg-laying, which results from the
setting up of signals by the nervous system to instruct that
breeding should occur.
Many examples can be quoted of how animals are vital
agents in the propagation of nerve impulses. Sodium and
potassium chlorides have an important role in neuronic activity,
as their ions are carriers of electric charges. In all this,
there is a resulting difference of electric potential inside and
__ __ __~ outside the cell. This, according to Gerardin (1968), can be
summarised by saying that the neuron is polarised with respect
to the external environment, with a potential difference of
seventy millivolts between the two sides of the cell, the inside
being negative, hence the significance of Borek's observation of
a "vast sea of chemlca.ls ," Perception itself is an
electra-chemical process, busy in the unconscious centres of the
body.
Human memory is still an unknown factor, but there is
sane evidence that it is distributed throughout the nervous
system, and is a "hastened depolarisation system," and is
thought to reside in the very large molecules of nucleic acid
and/ ...
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and is conditioned there by s~ple chemical processes. In this
way it seens almost certain, incoming infonnation is stored as
memory produced in the cells themselves. It has even been
thought that short-time memory is located in certain much
. branched and fibrous cells called neuroglia, which unlike
neurons, are constantly renewing themselves.
All living creatures have a common origin at the
molecular level, largely because amino acids and other organic
molecules could be fonned wi th ease on the primitive earth and
that in the space of a billion years, molecular evolution shaped
an organism capable of housing the mysterious quality of life.
"If a definition has to exclude as well as to include," says
Sherrington (1955, loco cit. p. 85), "it must lean on a logical
- boundary of what it defines; the tenn of life has no such
11 •
boundary fran lifeless," and Albert Szent-Cyorgy i says (1960),
"We will really approach the understanding of life, when all
structures and functions, all levels, from the electronic to the
supramolecular, will merge into one single unit."
Where in the material background, which is remarked upon
in the foregoing ·pages , do we find room for the emergence of
mind? Once again we turn to Sherrington (1955, loco cit. p ,
107), with his wisdom and deep philosophical insight, "Suppose
tentatively, at pause before the riddle," he says, "we allow
the pranise that in -t he developing embryo there resides sane
fonn of mind or psyche, and even in each of its consti tuen t
cells/ •••
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cells, and not inferior to what as human individual it will ever
have. Mind so present and intent on producing the child to be,
,
would still be faced at every step with "how." .It would be
helpless. It is an aggregate of cells doing what they are doing
for the first time and the only time they ever will. Yet every
step they take seems fraught with purpose towards a particular
end. The purpose clear, the "how" of it obscure. Watching the
limb-bud enlarge and shape without hitch to an ann, the
surprise is not when all goes right but when something goes
wrong. Perhaps it is best to think of it as an inherited final
cause."
The question whether matter can pranote itself and .so
ultimately give rise to the emergence of mind, has been
Ewing writes (1985), "Many thinkers have called the qualities of
mind and life emergent properties, by which they meant that they
emerge fran but are not explained by what went before. This is
certainly so at the level of human knowledge, but if it is
merely meant that the causation of these qualities is
unintelligible to us, this is the case not only as regards them
but as regards all instances of causation in the physical world.
The assertion of the "emergence theory" must be vfewed as mainly
a denial of the principle that a new kind of quality cannot come
into being, but those expositions of the theory I have read have
usually left it obscure whether the emergence of the new
quali ties/ ••.
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quali ties was supposed to have causes but causes which did not
render than intell igible .or whether it was supposed not to be
caused at all."
Emergence certainly does raise problems and one has to
confess that such a theory leaves much unsaid. In the meantime
let us hold out for what Polanyi calls "The vision of real i ty
beyond the impressions of the senses" (1958).
It is believed in discussing emergence one has to cast
back into evolutionary history, for in such history there may be
the liklihood of tracing cause, certainly greater liklihood than
pure speculation. For example, man's relation to the environ-
ment since early hominid times, could well be indicative of many
features of emergence, certainly in physical development. Young
(1971), has referred to developments in physical changes in man
since the middle of the Pleistocene, such as al terations in
glands, brains and no doubt reproductive functions. In
particular there is the emergence of "cul ture," proooted by
increased co-operation especially in evidence in the change from
Palaeolithic hunting to Neolithic habits and later to some form
of land usage. The establishment of home bases is also a sign
of reasoned behaviour, as was the need for attending to others.
Increasingly early man had to look to it that, in order to
survive, he had to evolve new habits of living, and with these
changes came changes in mental capacity and brain volume. In
this/ •••
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this respect "the single line of descent" succeeded with other
related lines fading out, Hano habilis being modern man's
authentic distant relatives. "Bone for bone, muscle for muscle,
organ for organ, every ape feature is repeated in the human
body," says Raner (1968). "The differences are mainly in
proportions and relationships of the structures concerned;
differences related mainly to methods of IOCOOJOtion and brain
growth and, as lesser features, the shortening of the face,
reduction of canine teeth and, in modern man, development of a
chin."
In the evolutionary stages of man, body and mind
developed fairly parallel with each other up to the later period
of H. erectus. Thereafter, mind energence accelerated, though
neural connectivity lagged, and it was not until the
pyschosocial stage that mental capacity advanced at its
astonisnmg rate. Speech had a particularly important role in
initiating brain and mind development, some authorities claiming
that this process commenced as far back as HOOJO erectus, about
a million years ago (Young, 1978, loc. cit. p. 186). Moreover
. since it is now shown that part of the basis of human speech is
inherited in the DNA, there must have been evolution of it going
back a very long way. At all events, speech, or language, has
played a very important part in the emergence of mind, some say
up to seventy per cent. Eccles states (1976), that "a human
child growing up in social isolation will fail to attain a full
consciousness/ •••
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consciousness of selL" (Sec under J.O. Ilrmson , 1976, p. 111).
Brain is considered by sane more difficult to fathcxn
than the concept of mind, states Young, referring to "our
current ignorance about brains" (1978, loco cf t , p.3). We can,
however, gain some insight about both brain and mind by
reference to the theory of emergence which has reference to
their origin.
Palaeontology has been extrffaely useful in this respect
and any rejection of its findings would certainly impoverish
discussion, even, as Young states, of the most abstract
problens , Biologists to-day must feel that literature on the
"human situation" lacks concrete calculations unless backed by
evolutionary theory. The growth of our knowledge of evolution,
slowly accumulating since about 1880, and the facts presented I
such as Haeckel' s observation that all creatures recapitulate
their evolutionary history, have surely, in the words of Blake,
tlcleansed the doors of our perception."
Unmson (1976) defines a philosopher also as a naturalist
"Lf he considers that the .t ot al ity of . things which we call
"na'ture" and which are studied in the natural sciences, is the
totality of all things whatever, and if he denies the need of
any explanations of the natural in terms of the supernatural;
such a 'philosopher will nonnally hold that any reference to a
dei ty or to a realm of values I or to mind I thought of as
something more than a natural phenomenon, is illegitimate.
With/ •••
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\Vi th regard to such nineteenth century thinkers as T.Il. llux ley ,
naturalism 'especially connoted a belief that life and thought
could be canpletely explained, in principle as arising by
evolution fran matter."
The study of the methods of natural science, together
with philosophical analysis by reflection, seems to be a
sensible approach in analysing the human situation, provided
such analysis is rational. A rational analysis would base its
judgements on a knowledge of evolutionary history. As an
example of this, consider the known roles of the cortex and the
mid-brain, or the new and old brain, which in sane respects
conflict. The cortex or "cold" brain, as it is sometimes
called, has its arousal system in the mid-brain, or' "hot" brain,
which latter as Taylor reports (1979, loco ci1. p. 28), is
impulsive, wilful, wants everything now, whil e the cortex looks
ahead and evaluates the results. The mid-brain tries to impose
its pattern on the external world, the cortex imposing external
organisation on the internal world, and Arthur Koestler has
. .
argued, as also quoted by Taylor, that man's troubles arise f'ron
the enormous development of the cortex, the pursuit of
intellectually imposed aims at the expense of more down-to-earth
thinking. At the same time the latter course carries with it
some primitive tendencies, such as lust for po~~r.
~~ether one agrees or not with such differentation, the
theory/ .••
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theory arises through scientific study of the "facts" of
evolution, that the human brain, in addition to evolving to a
greater volume over long ages, has to-day left man with a
possible two-level brain, not ' only in structural terms , but
mental as well. Science is attanpting to look into how the
total brain power splits up its complex task.
The point fran all this is that the course of man's
thinking, his personality, his philosophy, is conditioned by the
-Lrr t erpl ay of neural transmissions from different sites of the
whole brain. It is in -fact not a case 'of man having a brain,
but of having brains, with the possibility of direct effects on
the quality of rn1nd.
One often hears the expression that a person is a
"canplex character," and it is possible that the study of brai n
evolution will clarify some of the causes, such as the
integrated action of neural pathways between regions.
Neuroscience is a very practical discipline and is
dedicated to an analysis of brain4nind structure as evolved and
a possible more rational and realistic perspective fran which
philosophy could stand to benefit.
Young (1978, loco cit. p. 299) defines thinking as "the
perceptual and logical programs (i.e. sets of code signs in the
brain) to answer questions about infonnation coming from the '
'sense/ •••
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sense organs, or from internal sources," the last phrase being
the important part of this definition. This definition bears
weight, since Young sets out to demonstrate that the whole range
of human capacities and activities, such as problems of body and
mind, associated with believing and knowing, are. stored in the
brain. Without brain there is no thought." (p. 193).
Unfortunately, neuroscience has not yet any valid
concept of efficiency and direction of brain function or
intelligence in man, so it cannot be measured. In the process
of growth from infancy, the human stores all methods, verbal and
otherwise, that have been learned by virtue of inheritance of
human capabilities and the environment in which he has been
reared, to build up a "library" stored in the physical brain.
Young further states that man cannot say how the brain operates
to make comparisons possible and hence becomes capable of both
induction and deduction.
Creation of more neurons in the brain and later more
efficient connectivity during psychosocial evolution, has
measured the advance of what Young calls the dictionary of
gramnar of the brain, from early hominids to modern man. The
brain's entire highly complicated inner activity is continually
in contact during consciousness with the outside world, coding,
analysing and reflecting on the impulses coming in through
apperception of the environment. The ten thousand million nerve
cells in the human cerebral cortex (and each one is different)
individually/ •••
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individually correspond to one of the fol Iowing (1978, loco ci t ,
p.44):
a small part of one particular feature of change going on
in the outside world,
sane small part of a memory record of a past external
change, or
to some small part of the instructions for an action that
can be done by the body, say to ini tiate the movenen t of
a few fibres of one muscle.
This goes on fran moment to nxment and depends on the
power of the nerve cells to produce certain electrical and
chemical changes, transmitting signals known as nerve impulses
or action potentials. Superimposed on such intricate brain
activity are what Julian Huxley (1974, loc. · cit. p. 42)
describes as "long-continued trends, 11 and it is in the
imposi tion of such trends that one recalls the possibility of
purpose or adaptive processes directed towards an end, and are
part of evolution, which varies fran group to group of animals
and for which no single formula is universally applicable.
Nevertheless science is methodically studying the complexity of
the brain, and every fundamental advance in science, as A.E.
Taylor says (1930), calls for a "restatement and reconsideration




Bwing (1985, loco cit. p. 225) renarks on the miracle of
the brain with the words that the adaptation of Liv.ing bodies of
organisms to their ends and to the ends of their species, is
certainly very wonderful. There are, he states, "thousands of
millions of cells in our brain knit together in a system which
works. Twenty or thirty different muscles are involved even in
such a simple act as a sneeze. Directly a wound is inflicted or
germs enter the ' animal's body, all sorts of protective
mechanisms are set up, and different cells are so cunningly
arranged that, if we cut off the tail of one of the lower
animals, a new one is grown, and the very same cells can develop
according to what is needed into a tail or into a leg. Such
intricate arrangements seem to require an intelligent purposing
mind to explain then."
Goudge (1976) has stated that evolutionary ideas had
very little impact on how the human mind is to be regarded until
recent years. The. facts of adaptability of species is well
known, such as the giraffe's development of a long neck to get
at the type of foliage required to survive, but what of mental
capacity? What explanations are th~re for the theory of its
emergence? Roger Sperry has said that "Mind is an emergent
property of cerebral excitation," and he is definite that mind
can affect the brain as well as the reverse, a sort of emergent
interactionism (Taylor 1979, loco cit. p. 300).
As an information system, the mind depends on energy expended by
brain neurons, and the emergence of mind is a case of derivation
fran/ •••
-116-
fran a lower to a higher form, It is known, for example, that
every cell in the human body, and not only in the brain,
contains thousands of discreet hereditary units or genes, a gene
being defined as the unit factor of Mendelian inheritance but
which can change by mutation. What happens in the cell, as
Raner outlines (1968), is that in each cell there is a long
spiral thread~like molecule of a complex compound, namely DNA in
the chrarosane, which consti tutes "the essence of life i tsel f • "
What happens in the cell not only controls life's development,
but factors of inheritance, and is thus a controlling unit, and
has much influence upon intelligence and personal thinking, if
we accept Bartlett' s definition of thinking as "a high-Level
form of skilled behaviour requiring sign and symbols for its
. expression yet still possessing many of the characteristics of
the earlier established bodily skills which it may have
developed and which it has supplemented" (1964).
From the above, the theory could be that both ~ind and
matter have a common origin and that the improvement in
organisation of the latter (as in the brain) is paralleled by
the improvement in mental capacity, which is the theory of
emergence of mind as evidenced by evolution.
Defining conditions for being mental, present a
formidable problem, let alone seeking a definition of mind as
such. One has only to glance at historical concepts, Aristotle,
for example, unifying mind with God, while Broad regards it as a
phenanenon / •••
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phenanenon that provides thought with a certain specific
reference. Bertrand Russell claims that experience is the ~~sis
of both body and mind, while Spinoza regards thought and
physical extension as modes of a single substance. The
persistent problem of body-mind relationship is solved by
Descartes by stating that thought and physical extension are
modes of a single substance. Berkeley of 'course states that
matter does not exist and ideas are only in the mind, actually
an ingenious attempt, which proved unstable, to unify
metaphysics and common sense (1983).
E.W:i.ng states (1985, loco ctt , p, 74) that physical
object~, if they are known to us, must be related to mind, and
that we therefore cannot tell what they would be like apart from
mind, since we cannot know them without ipso facto relating them
to mind. The oak tree in the garden stays as an impression or
form in my mind, even though it was burnt down last year and all
its constituent parts transformed into dispersed chemicals. But
form can be retained when matter undergoes change such as the
fact that in seven years time, my body will have undergone a
complete chemical replacement, though not the form, apart from
growth. The atom is reduced to electrons, which possibly is no
more than a useful mental picture to symbolize certain
mathematical relations and so we cannot properly deny the
relativity of the conception of a single substance.
Associated with the problem of mind 's relation to the
body, there is a long history of philosophical opinion, many
serious/ •••
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serious difficulties being attached to the conception of
causal i ty between the mental and the physcral :worlds. Such
difficulties gave rise to Occasionalism and led to certain
doctrines of Leibniz, for example pre-established harmony.
Generally, and for the purposes of psychology, a simple
parallelism was assumed, ultimate and deeper explanations
tend~ng to assume either a materialistic form (e.g.
epiphenomenology, the theory that mental or spiritual entities
are not realities in their own right but merely by-products of
matter which perish when the material base is destroyed), or
again, for example, Spinoza's doctrine that mind and body are
parallel manifestations of a single Infinite Substance. Neither
is cause of the other, nor is either of them an effect in the
ordinary sense of the word, but simply parallel attributes of a
single substance. Nor in this historical retrospect must one
forget the impact of the theory of Occasionalism, as above
referred to. This theory sought to explain in a less difficult
way problans of causation by assuming Divine interference which
adjusted the relations between two things which appeared to act
on each other, but really did not, in respect particularly of
body and mind where God continually exerted his influence. In
other words, the correlation between the run of events in the
one substance and the run of events in the other was explained
by the intervention of God. Such a doctrine depends on the
straightforward argument that doing something involves knowing
howl • • •
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how to do it, material bodies knowing nothing cannot act, their
apparent action upon each other is an act of God. Uind provides
the occasion for a Divine act in the other substance, body.
For Descartes, a human being was the point of union of
material substance and inrnaterial substance and it is
interesting to note that his followers finding difficulty with
attempting to explain Descartes' conception that these disparate
substances, body and mind, could act upon each other, called in
the solution of God's intervention.
In modern times, the complex problews involved in
examining the relations between body and mind were thoroughly
explored by Broad (1925). Broad had a training in physics, and
regarded British Idealism as "not for him." Consequently he
first set out to gain a - thorough background in critical
philosophy in order to analyse and define concepts such as
person, matter, perception and then to criticise the fundamental
propositions which contain them, thus dispensing with vague and
instinctive beliefs. As a result, he produced no less than
seventeen different theories -of the relation between mind and
matter, the one nost favoured being "emergent materialism. 11 In
such a philosophy, the characteristic of mentality belongs only
to events which also possess an elaborate conjunction of
material characteristics.
The viewpoint of saying that the factor of mentality is
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emergent is that its presence is not deducible from the
constitution and conduct of t he material factors considered
independently of one another, or in combination with different
characteristics, or as Ayer says (1982, loco cit. p. 176), is
not incompatible with holding t hat the mental characteristics of
the events which possess than are causally dependent upon the
mental characteristics which these events also possess, when
their material characteristics are combined as they are. This
concedes that only a particular organisation of matter is
sufficient t-o produce mentality. Furthenrore, if we also hold:
that nothing has only mental characteristics, we shall _not be
comnitted to holding that this particular organisation is also
necessary for mentality to emerge, at w-hatever level is in
question, for some other form of material organisation might be
. sufficient as well.
The laws of physics and chemistry will never adequately
explain life, as Bergson has reasoned, · and it would appear that
some divine vital force is present and this is only grasped by
man's intuition. It would seen that the force even directs
evolution, though as Bergson confesses, it is not possible to
explain how and why the movement of evolution occurs.
Nevertheless, his great work "Creative Evolution" is prophetic,
because without being mystical, metaphysics turns again and
again to the possibility that matter is . represented by an
underlying force · or tendency in nature. No scientific
explanation is forthcoming and many biologists deplore this.
Julian/ ••.
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Julian . Huxley himself states (1974 · loco cit. p , 458) that
Bergson's life force served as "a symbolic description of the
thrust of life during its evolution, but not as a scientific
explanation."
In this study, we should really be writing about mental
capacity rather than mind, since the former is a phenomenon
reserved for a process of evolution, whereas the latter is a
controversial term. For example, Aristotle spoke of the
vegetable and animal soul, which were stages in life, later
surpassed by human consciousness of itself derived through
sharing, as much as the animal is permitted to do, the Universal
or Divine Mind. Specifically in later times mind referred on
the one hand to products of thought, · such as political, moral
institutions, customs, laws et cetera, and on the other and more
permanent side to the universal principle which creates and
sustains the world. Another concept of mind is that which is in
body, which is psychological and it seems to be the case this
definition, limiting as it is, is the one most commonly referred
to by philosophers in discussing the mind-body problem, and is
actually a concept without sufficient foundation in reality,
except in those instances which regard the "I" as not connected
with the body in any "physiological" way, that is, not
primordial to the body.
The other concept of mind, which we would like to term
the evolutionary concept, is that mental capacity emerged
initially/ •••
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ini tially and referred to such "products" as those associated
wi th living in the natural environment as a thinking being.
Such a thinking being need never have existed, for example my
father might well never have met my mother. But, and this is
the important pornt , that thinking being made possible by the
neurological background (brain) built into him by the process of
evolution, also evolved the capacity for its "thinking faculty"
to cover the whole of man's inner personal nature in addition to
the intellectual side. And t hi s latter capacity is caused by
unconscious feelings and needs of something more beyond, and
that unconscious desire is associated with a stage which is
introspectively observed, but which cannot be directly observed.
In actuality, Ewing refers to this latter in the following words
(1985, loco cit , p, 111) : "All we can say is that it is very
surprising that so important an element in experience as these
desires ·should often be inaccessible to introspection."
Evolved mental · capacity leads to · self-identity as
preserved in time and a thought implies a thinker distinct from
any thought, but that does not make the thoughts any more than a
series of events. On the other hand , the important point ; as
Ewing states, is that we certainly do seem .t o have some
experience of the "I" which we do not have of anything else,
"but it is extraordinarily difficult to be clear what we are




The dilemma is often resolved by proclaiming a pure Ego
as distinct from its experiences, and yet giving it content by
ascribing to it the dispositional properties in question, would
be rather hypothetical, because experiences are the only actual
quali ties we can ascribe to a mind. The argument becomes
complex when we ask "need a mind to exist have experiences?"
But if we think of it as something apart from its experiences,
we come to the notion of a substance over and above its
qualities, and this projects us irrmediately into the greatest
problem facing mind-body relationship.
There is also the problem that different people think
differently, but such a hurdle can be cleared by the fact that
the metaphysical value of deeper issues involves unity between
different selves. In this respect mind can be studied
historically as a whole. The incompatibility of other minds is
associated with conscious mental · processes and need not in a
metaphysical sense be regarded as incompatible.
Each of us has direct access to our own states of mind
in a way that we do not to the physical, that is, privileged
access, which gives rise to the belief that the mental
constitutes, in some form, the only reality, a belief which
Berkeley must have held when he denied any reality beyond ideas,
a philosophy which to-day possesses a certain incoherence,
according to Hamlyn, in any case (1984).
It might be mentioned in connection with dualism. that
many/ •••
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many people adopt a cannon sense acceptance of mind and body,
believing intuitively in mental reality as a state, and
similarly body as a state, the latter because they realise that
bodily sensations are normally locatable in some part of the
body and for that reason are more intimately concerned with body
than thoughts, even if such sensations depend upon the brain,
and even though such sensations do have quite a lot in common
with the mental. The main feature being that such separate
i terns are by no means identical. This is substantiated by the
fact that certain things are mentally private, as only one
person can perceive them. Mental states are, or can be,
strictly personal, such as having a pain. At the same time it
has to be realised that while there can be some doubt about a
mental state being private, it is not necessarily an independent
sufficient condition to make a definite and final decision about
what is mental and what is not, or not without a degree of
circularity. There is also the theory that pain is a feedback
between cortex and mid-brain, and furthenrore that this is a
necessary condition for pain to be experienced as distinct from
being known about. (Taylor, loco cit. p. 126).
According to most ordinary empirical criteria which are
widely accepted, bodily processes are causally related to mental
and vice versa, and therefore, according to Ewing (loc. cit. p.
127), it seems reasonable to accept this evidence (unless there
is a strong argument against it), and such would lend strength
to interaction. In this connection, Eccles states that for
every mental event there is a unique brain-state. He also
observes/ •••
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observes, "Many men of science, (which includes Eddington,
Sherrington and Adrian) find in dualism and interaction the most
.acceptable initial postulates in a scientific approach to the
problem of mind and brain" (1951, loco cH. p. 53).
Most early philosophers, even before Socrates , have
distinguished between mind and body, realising that man is not
just a collection of material particles. Prominent concerning
the relationship, was whether mind overruled the body, and wi th
this came the argument between determinism and indeterminism,
the former which could be described as maintaining that for
everything .that ever happens, there are condi tions such that,
given them, nothing . else could happen, and such a philosophy
depends greatly on interdependence of things and events without
exception or not. For example, in ethical determinism, freedom
is the determination of the will by what is good and right. Man
cannot be free without obedience to the highest will, and in
connection with this, God could not possibly be guided by
. anything except the true good which inspired his making of the
world. .Of course philosophy had opponents to this version,
William James' insisting that reason and intellect should also
have a say, Le. freedan in philosophy, that is we· have a right
to believe in God or not, as brought out in his publication "The
Will to Believe." God is in the world and we do best to
co-Operate with him in realising common values and purposes.
The determining power of mind over body is argued not
only/ •••
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only in the ethical and religious fields but also in the logical
and physical fields. As regards the fonner, it was early
considered that logic alone suggests that man's will is fettered
and that he can really alter nothing. The Greeks seemed to take
detenminism seriously, the gods themselves making decisions for
man, and all that ever happens is all that could possibly
happen.
Later philosophy modified this, for example by inquiring
first what is necessary or impossible in actions, and not purely
unavoidable. Then there is also the problem of the future, do
things just "wait around ll in order to become present or do they
exist in a nebulous state?
As regards physical determinism, theories are inspired
mainly by the developnents in physical science, the movement of
heavenly bodies whose course was determined with mathematical
precision. At first rather speculative, as in Aristotle's time,
this gradually gave away to experiment and the search for
scientific laws. Ancient . theories of determinism were
submitted to exact scientific scrutiny, which all told, caused
man to cease referring events to God's will alone, but also to
eternal . and imnutable laws of nature, the extreme case being
that of Hobbes, whose fundamental interpretation was to study
human nature according to the basic presupposi tions of the
science of bodies (physics), and many present day philosophers
differ very little also from one of this profound thinker's
viewpoints/ •••
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viewpoints, namely that denying the existence of any tmmaterial
soul or spirit in man, is fraught with the danger at the same
time of destroying his need for freedom.
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Summary of Chapter Three
Indelible features were stamped on early hominids about
a million and a half years ago and are continuous right through
in man to-day, for example molar crowns.
Through all this long period brain evolution was also .
continuing, creating the neural potential for mental capacity.
Such a parallel emergence can be roughly interpreted from Figure
1 in the text.
As man's elaborate social traditions began to take over,
the evolution of mental capacity began to accelerate, until
eventually in the psychosocial state of evolution he was
considered capable of transmitting some non-genetic components
of culture.
A feeling, thinking brain began to take over, ensuring
that man became the dominant type with . the still further
emergence of mental capaci ty in the enlarged cortex, wi th its
power of abstraction.
Biologists have noted the important role of chemicals in
the functioning of the brain~ind complex, even as vital agents
conditioning the power of thinking.
The remarkable working of the human brain supports the
theory of some power or vital force promoting an a priori form
of knowledge.
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EMERGENCE OF MENTAL AUTONOMY
One can safely observe that if subjectivity existed at
all in Australopithecines it was not of the ~e calibre as that
of himans to-day, even though the neurological structure as such
of the smaller brain is believed to have remained basically
similar. Through the long ages of hominid evolution the quality
in particular, as well as the quantity, of neuronal development
has been a feature, by quality meaning the sophistication of
neuronal connectivi ty, a purely physical process, · Lnvol.vf.ng.
electrochemical transformations as well. The implication to be
learned from this is that in the two to three million years of
brain volume expanston, there has been a gradual emergence of
mentalcapaci ty , characterised by subjectivity as a
self-conscious phenomenon, also gradually emerging.
Such a phenomenon came to be set apart fran natural
processes of cause and effect as in natural events. This view,
known as animism. is that ail manifestations of human life. and
in particular the emergent mind, are due to the operation of
sanething that is of a nature. "different" to the body. as
Mc Dougall suggests (1926) , though as a psychologist he is not




The animisation of mind, that is, the view that it is
above and apart from physical brain, derives far back in human
history and was also transferred to natural objects which were
therefore personified.
Stringent dualism as formulated by the Cartesian view,
did not go unchallenged, and early dissenters were Hobbes and
Pierre Gassendi, the latter stating that mental activities were
fully explicable in terms of "physical distortion of the
material of the brain. 11 As an agnostic, Hobbes was severely
criticised by Locke, Spinoza and Leibniz, but later admired by
Marx for his "pioneering philosophy of materialism."
The body-mind problem dates far back in the history of
philosophy, since it really involves the whole problem of human
nature, and one way of studying human nature in . pre....:Cartesian
times was the study of physics. This anthropanorphic trend in
Scholastic metaphysics and physics was contrary to orthodox
religion, and Descartes ' widespread success was his attempt to
restore the strict spirit of catholicism, although at the same
time he remained a mathematician of great influence. His early
attainments were no doubt inspired by the influence of Greek
philosophy which had come into full force during the Middle
Ages, when the tug-of-war between orthodox religion on the one
hand and the philosophy of both Aristotle and Plato tended to
draw intellectuals towards physics. It was a case of the
primacy of theology or the primacy of philosophy.
In/ •••
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In all criticisms of dualism, there is noted a call for
economy in metaphysical speculation and a keeping to true facts,
while not actually condemning non-speculative· metaphysics.
There were, in fact, a number of good reasons to turn from the
orthodox animistic model, apart from what has been said above.
There is, for example, modern technology, such as surgical
advance, psychology, electra-technology and biophysics. Also
empirical data such as growth of brain volume and emergence of
corresponding intelligence. The study of brain structure as
well provides sufficient condition for mind. Furthermore,
surgical interference with physical brain impairs cognitive
self, while splitting the brain in two, leads to dual minds.
Damage to brain also damages behaviour.
As regards the theoretical, conceptual models are
thought to be related to electromagnetic pattern distribution,
while the neuron itself is ·an "on-off mechanism" affecting the
nervous system. Wilson observes (1979) that the real force of
scientific evidence lies in the progressive erosion of the
orthodox concept of mind .as something independent of physical
objects and forces and their complex dynamic relations. One
prefers not to maintain independence, otherwise the evolutionary
theory of emergence would make no sense, because if there were
not dependence there would be nothing left to call mind.
'.the foregoing arguments led right to the crux of the
matter, namely the brain-mind identity theory, disputes about
this/ •••
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this theory actually leading beyond the philosophy of mind,
mostly because the material world of science shows the basic
composition of sub-atomic and atomic particles or energy quanta ,
in incalculable permutations and hierarchically ordered
combinations throughout a universal mass-energy quantum. Eccles
states (1951) that scientific hypothesis such as above would
"represent an extension of . natural science to a field of
non-sensual concepts, and even to a field outside the
matter-energy system of the natural world. 1I Sherrington holds a
similar ·view. In fact, it is hardly desirable that . we should
ignore or discount relative scientific facts.
It is the spectacular successes of science that point
philosophy to the . view of brain~ind identity. Further, human
mentality, rationality and even purposefulness , now stand among
the phenomena that come within the compass of
scientifically-based · explanations. Because of such advances,
the brain-mind identity theory is among the most discussed
topics on the current philosophical scene, and in fact the
identity theory is central to the contemporary physicalist
view.
Wi thout detracting from the fundamental philosophy of
identity, Wilson (1979, loco cit. p. 67) states that it has
become something of a convention to distinguish three
significant variants ·to the theory, namely the raw feel view,
the critical realist view, and the eliminationist view. The
first/ •••
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first is associated with Russell, Feigl and Pepper and is
characterised by the sophisticated quasi-idealist view that the
"physical," with which the mental is identified, is ultimately
constructed out of the inmediate data of consciousness or "raw
feels" or direct .acquat nt ance , A weakness here is that the
brain-state universals or pure episodes of direct experience or
raw feels," (named as such by the American psychologist E.C.
Tolman) , are in fact rarely encountered, and are an analytical
abstraction fran ordinary adult experience. Hence one could
label such identity as "weak," if "raw feels" could not be
dismissed as implausible. If they could be dismissed, the form
of identity would be "strict."
The critical realist version of identity is better known
as "central state materialism," and is associated with Place,
Smart, Armstrong and others, and specifies that the true nature
of the mental is really a particular or sentient and sapient
sort of physical process, namely that of the central nervous
system, the ' physical process being ontologically, though not
epistimologically, primary. The mental is thus held to be
continuous with the inanimate world described by physics. This
version was later formulated by extending the "central state"
accourit to the "whole range of mental phenanena," and in such a
case would continue to be strict identity, though certain
irresoluble qualities are a "worrying" factor. This form of
identity also does acknowledge inrnediate inner experience, but
regards it as of trivial consequence. Annstrong in amitting
mind/ •••
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mind, as he strictly does, leaves out a feature that is least
amenable to a materialistic interpretation.
The last of the three variants of the identity theory,
namely the eliminationist version, is characterised by the
thesis that the mental that is identified with the physical, is
nothing more than a verbal fiction.
Richard Rorty of Princeton University is critical of the
use, or misuse, of language and deviant uses of words, uses
which in fact result fran a confusion between the uses of two or
more senses for the same tenn ( 1965) • Later on in his
publIcat.Ion, Rorty refers to the mind as "that great
dumping-ground of out-dated entities." Other philosophers,
such as Feyerabend and Cornrnan, , think along similar lines.
Nevertheless, however, whisking away concepts on the grounds of
cunning verbal disguises, may not always be verifiable. What is
really at danger, is "untrammelled speculative metaphysics."
, Mind 'f unct i ons conceptually, and much of the confusion in the
' or t hodox view of mind, has remained undetected because the
granmatical correctness of expressions employing substantive
"mental" terms disguises their categorical , irregularity • The
orthodox concept of mind as a substance is regarded as a
"specious, para-mechanical hypothesis, a verbal mirage."
In the evolutionary context, as envisioned, mind,
because/ •••
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because of its natural and necessary emergence, is an organising
"ability" of the infinite complexity of the neuronal brain.
Its particularly rapid and efficient emergence as an organising
function of the brain in the cultural period, was, and is, out
of necessity to enable man to cope, and not be a moron.
Organisation of the neural brain is a non-physical urge
permeating the brain's neural network systems. On the basis of
its gradual emergence, mind is not defined as a substance, but
by a naturally emerged force, organising the electro-chemical
connectivity of the brain as dictated by the process of
evolution.
In referring to a university as being well organised we
do not refer to the architecture but to the staff. It is "in
the sense" that the staff is identical with the university that
the mind is · "Lderrtfca.l" with the brain, if such a model is
permitted. One can only "assume" that mental activity is
disposed to work in a certain direction, that is, whether the
neural basis for mentality can by analogy be referred to the
natural environment basis of an overruling Creator. It is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attempt to discover
criteria for identifying or individuating non-spacial substances
whose existence is somewhat continuous with corporeal persons.
Mind is not only undefinable and undescribable, but has
no physical content. It cannot be saddled with the need for
austere self-discipline to keep strictly in step wi th neuro-
physiology/ •••
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physiology, for example, and beyond that, no one really has the
faintest idea of how actually to correlate the higher mental
processes with cerebral structures, which are assumed to serve
them. The Russian neurologist, Luria, has attempted this but
without great success (1973). Luria, according to Young (1978),
does not hesitate to speak of the brain as the agent that
"creates" models of the future, thus largely by-passing problems
of the role of mind.
Over and over again, search for concrete infonnation
about what mind "is", as apart from what it "does," brings one
up against a blank wall. The Gennan physicist, · Heisenberg
(1953) once wrote, "Anybody who desires to understand something
of modern atomic theory, will do well to study the history of
the atom in order to become acquainted with the origins of those
ideas which have come to full fruition in modern physics."
. Regrettably, nothing yet in mental anlaysis corresponds, even
remotely, to nuclear physics, and any theory of what mind "is"
also remains very remote. However, what mind does, (however
speculative), is instructive in regard to a subject (brain~ind
relationship) which has haunted philosophy ever since Ariaxagoras
and Heraclitus meditated on the nature of man and the universe.
The ancient Greeks were indeed aware of the profound riddles
posed by attempting to come to terms with the nature of mind.
After such as Epicurus and Lucretius, materialism was
little in evidence until after the long scholastic tradition of
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Aristotle, in fact right up to the eighteenth century when d'
Holbach, Lamettrie (1747) and Hobbes held the floor. It is
claimed that Descartes actually opened the door to extreme
materialism by his separation of body and soul.
The materialism of the nineteenth century was expounded
notably by Thomas Huxley, and in the twentieth century by
Watson, Hebb and others, and presently very _s t r ongl y by
D.M. Annstrong (1971), who is possibly the most influential,
though Smart, Place and Feigl are also strong advocates. Hocutt
observes (1966-7), "Not only has materialism returned, but it
has lost the discouragement Sherrington feigned upon not being
able to discover where in the brain the mind is located. 11
Hocutt also states, in passing (Ioc, ci t , p. 377), that "as
failure to mean that mental events are brain processes does not
prove they are not brain processes, so ignorance of
neurophystology fails to prove that mental events of which we
have some knowledge are not in fact neurophysiological processes
of which we are ignorant." Which is not surprising, since
nothing has ever been deducible about the world from our
ignorance. To-day, after over two thousand years of rational
philosophy, Sherrington 's confession causes us to realise how
really ignorant we are about the nature of mind, and still less
how it is related to the brain. The first sharp distinction
. .
between the soul and the body was in fact made by Plato, holding
that the soul could exist both before and after its residence in
the body and could rule the body during that residence, a study
later taken up by St. Augustine.
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Such indeed was a way to avert religious chastisement,
up to the eighteenth century, anyway. Even the French
materialists of the Enlightenment, such as Lamettrie himself,
shrank :from concluding that all humans are autanata devoid of
all mental events, judging by the book Lamettrie published in
1750 under the title "Animals more than Machines," a view that'
seems to be epiphenomenalistic, in that both animals and men do
have mental events, but these are completely causally dependent
on bodily activity. Holbach, also, held an identity theory,
that thoughts and feelings occur, to be sure, but are physical
in nature. T. Huxley also, did not deny thoughts and feelings,
but what he objected to was the Cartesian doctrine that in the
case of humans, thoughts and feelings constitute a separate,
nonphysical substance that can affect the body, that men's
thoughts, spiritual intercourse and so on, still appear as the
direct emanation of their material conduct.
To-day the body-mind problem is being studied by
neurophysiology in great earnest by means of numerous vi tal
experiments, as for example, the search for personal identity in
such experiments as those of Sperry in bisecting brains.
Evidence fran such research has led Sperry to conclude that the
"right mind" and the "left mind" are not only . distinguishable
but may even be in opposition (1966). The implication of such
research is that, since the purely physical subdivision of the
physical brain alone is a sufficient condition for the
subdivision of mind also, then the existence of an appropriately
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functionally integrated brain is alone a sufficient condition
for both mind and consciousness.
Further evidence would suggest that mind and personality
may be based only in the functional integration of brain
sub-systems.
Over the centuries there have been two principal ways of
establishing the status of person. With the Greek and medieval
philosopher it can be said that the problem lay between the soul
and the body, the term soul signifying among the Greeks the term
intellect or reason, a concept that still lingers to-day. The
soul is what makes something alive, so that even plants have
souls and humans reasoning souls, the reasoning faculty setting
them apart and above all other animals. Nowhere is there a
conception of an inner or private life, and such never existed
until Descartes came on the scene. It was he who mostly raised
the problem of how body and soul (mind) were to be reconciled,
or how they were to interact. In fact interaction posed a
serious difficulty, even as did Spinoza, with his claim that
body and mind are one, that is, he considered the mental and the
physical as two aspects of a single substance, or in the case of
Leibniz, mental events are parallel to bodily events with no
causal relationship.
The approach to the place of mind with regard to the
human brain is an historical problem, but all along, the
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pr1mary certainty has been experience, the ~ediate realisation
being that experience is not a physical object but sanething
mental. Though mental is unanalysable, the unanalysable is not
unknowable, and we do know qui te a lot- about the mind by
.experience, . though we cannot explain it in terms of anything
else, so that a person could understand what it was like if he
had never had the experience. Therefore, quite obviously the
obstacle to analysing brain or body-to-rnind relationship, is
having no clear concept of what mind is. A large number of
statements have been made as to what mind stands for or
represents, but none as to what it "is."
The important feature considered here is that theory
holds mind as a reflection of self (Eddington), and it has
developed "functional ability" in conjunction with neuronal
brain. One can say with reasonable certainty that it . is
develoPed brain . connectivity, which accounts · for differing
levels of mental capacity.
The theory that the brain, in its course of evolution
fran early haninids, has evolved the potential to produce stages
of increase in mental capacity, raises the question of
emergents, that is, that mind progressively emerged as neuronic
brain progressively enlarged in volume, as depicted in Figure 1.
It is not felt that the emergence of mental capacity was that of
a novelty, of which there are many examples in evolution, or on




As regards the further stage of emergence, namely that
of subjective phenomena fran mental capacity, it is held that
subjective phenomena emergence are adequately justified or
explainable on the basis of the "rarified" canplexity of mental
phenomena. In other words, the nature of mental capacity is
sufficient in itself to account for subjective phenomena, The
doctrine of emergence has been carefully examined by Kekes
(1966), and has been the basis of much sound reasoning. In this
respect, mental concepts as ordinarily regarded, cannot be
entirely ontologically neutral, that is, "inner disposftion
states" and could not ever have been entirely linked with the
central nervous systen or brain states, that is, as stated
above, the energence of mental states was not at any time a
novelty, It is as well to quote :Ewing in this connection. He
observes (1985), "Many thinkers have called the qualities of
mind and life energent properties, by which they meant that they
energe from, but are not explained by, what went before. This
is certainly so at the level of human knowledge, but if it is
merely meant that the causation of these .qualities is
unintelligible to us, this is the case not only as regards them
but as regards all instances of causation in the physical world.
The assertion of the "emergence theory" must be viewed as mainly
a denial of the principle that a new kind of quality cannot come
into being, but those expost tions of the theory I have read
usually left it obscure whether the energence of the new
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qualities was supposed to have causes but causes which did not
render than intelligible or whether it was supposed not to be
caused at all."
Scientists generally put the problan of emergence to one
side by referring to neurological mechanisms as "the substrate
for mind." A further explanation is that of interaction. For
example Sperry claims that "mind is an emergent property of
cerebral excitation. " In the course of evolution, awareness
devel.oped into self-awareness, self-awareness into reflection.
And Sperry is definite that mind can affect the brain as well as
. the reverse. Taylor points out (1979), the expression is
dualist and Sperrydoes not really face up to the underlying
question of "how" this canes about.
A feature which deepens the veiled meaning of mind is
the manner in which one mind can act on another at a distance
without ccmnunication through the senses. Telepathy and other
extra-sensory activities have been extensively studied by such
scfentf.sts as J .B. Rhine ("Extra-Sensory Perception," London,
1935), and G.N.M. Tyrell "Sane Experinients in Undifferentiated
Extra-Sensory Perception," J. Soc. Psych. Res , , 28, 52). Work
such as this, according to Julian Huxley in his classical volume
"Evolution" p. 574, "is now forcing upon the scientific world a
subject demanding close analysis."
This form of mental canmunication reveals that the mind
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has undiscovered powers, though such powers continue to elude
analysis. The Society for Psychical Research has been founded
for over one ' hundred years without producing any reliable data.
There are two generally accepted theories, however, the first
being that telepathy is some form of extension of our existing
senses by a non~agnetic normal force, and the second, that all
minds are in touch but generally ignored. It will be
recollected that C.D. Broad, who disliked speculation, was a
calm . and reasonable teacher, with a cool and cautious
temperament, and he took a deep interest in psychical research.
He regarded paranormal phenomena as due to the persistence after
death of a "pyschic factor," which had previously formed
together with the brain and nervous system, a "canpound11 . of
which mentality was an emergent quality.
The question appears to be whether we can know of the
existence of minds other than our own, the possibility of which,
according to Ewing (1985, Ioc, ci t , p , 120) is difficul t to
logically disprove. Ewing considers it preferable not to claim
direct awareness of other minds, because the belief in other
minds is too natural and instinctive for it to be possible to
account for it by argument at all.
The problem can be left to rest by asstuning that
paranormal events are at a level higher than Alexander's fifth
emergent and thereby acquiring a hitherto unanalysable
dimension. What is really of concern is the "relationship" of
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the mental and the physical. To-day the accent is on
neurophysiological. research, which according to Ryle, quoted by
Puccetti (1964), "we philosophers have been chiefly to blame,"
for various reasons in blocking the progress of research, a
statement with which Wilder Penfield agreed. In many respects
it is unprofessional that there should be any variance between
science and philosophy on so human a problem as body to mind
relationship. Both disciplines should work closely together.
Sherrington, quoted by LasIet.t (1957), states, "The physical
basis of mind enroaches more and more upon the study of mind,
but there remain mental events which seem to lie beyond any
physiology of the brain . • • • • • • It is a far cry from an
electrical reaction in the brain to suddenly seeing the world
around one, wi th all its di stance,
chiaroscuro."
its colours and
Adrian says he thinks an important "part of our picture"
of the brain4TIental events may always be missing, and to such
thoughts Penfield adds that "something else" finds a
dwelling-place between the sensory complex and the motor
mechanisms of the body, and quite recently stated that brain and
mind must be conceived as separate "entities" having each a
distinct essence. (See "Pavlov in Retreat," the Observer,





show scientists are as much
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brain~ind relationship which ever since the days of Aristotle
has arrived at no clear-cut solution.
It looks as though the trouble with professionals, as
Russell Brain concludes (1957, in loco cit. P. Laslett, "The
Physical Basis of Mind"), is that in the nervous system
scientists are "looking at; the threads, while with the mind we
perceive the patterns, and one day we shall discover how the
patterns are made out of the threads." Russell Brain I s metaphor
is apt, since patterns (mental concepts) emerge from utilization
of the threads (neurons). In a certain sense, the threads
constitute the pattern and in that sense there Is interaction.
One could really name Spinoza as the founder of the
identity theory, when in his "Ethics", Part 1, Axiom V, he wrote
of extension and thought as two attributes of one substance, not
interacting, but each infinitely diversified into modes which
"occur together." The most interesting case of this occurring
together is in human beings, where mental events are paralleled
by physical events. The mind is "the idea of the body" (1983,
see Unnson, "Western Philosophy and Philosophers," p , 274).
Contrary to Descartes, Spinoza maintained that only like can
affect like, and two distinctly different ultimate substances
could not affect each other. Consequently, he sought to solve
the mind-body problem by uniting the two as one and the same
substance. Each is merely an aspect, an attribute of substance,
as stated above. Substance is the ultimate
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ontological reality. Thus when any effect is taking place in
either mind or body, it is actually one and the same substance
itself that is being affected, which in turn affects all of its
attributes. The body cannot detennine mind to think, neither
can mind determine body to motion or rest. In fact, Spinoza
claims that wherever there is body, mind will always accompany
it.
Such words were written over three hundred centuries ago
and their deep insight into a nagging problem, really
anticipates contemporary philosophy and even neuroscience, so
without doubt Spinoza can be regarded as the first to lucidly
present the theory of identity.
In contemporary times, Herbert Feigl, the American
philosopher, may well be considered the leading authority on the
nature of the mind-body problem, which Anglo-saxon philosophers
have actively inherited through Descartes, and which has been
compounded by the empiricist heritage of Hume.
To-day, philosophers such as Feigl, proceed on the
a.ssumption that there can be no subjective phenomena and that
the solution of the problem must stand or fall with the adequacy
of the dictates of a unitary set of physical laws. Feigl does
admit "it makes perfectly good sense to speak of the
subjectivity or privacy of imnediate experience" (1957), but
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such raw feels are identified with certain "brain state"
universals. Wilfrid Sellars (1965) of the University of
Pittsburg, is not satisfied with the indetenninate nature of
brain-state universals and suggests that they should be,
submitted to neurophysiological analysis by reducibility to
micro-physics with a more adequate theoretical explanation of
the nature and function of subjective phenomena. Feigl admits
difficulties ahead for metascientific study, that is on the
"results" of both science and the logic and epistanology of
scientific method. In other words "there is plenty of work left
for philosophers in the logical analysis of intricate relations
between phenomenal and physical terms ,"
The above really calls for further philosophic and
scientific analysis to eliminate the "crudeness" rron
materialism (identity), which assunes that the only entities
existing in the world are atoms, aggregates of atoms and that
the only properties and relations are the properties of, and the
relations between, such aggregates. On the other hand few
contemporary philosophers will deny that mental processes are
things with which we are "directly acquainted," and further,
that there can hardly be any doubt that they can be known
completely and with certainty. Actually, one has the impression
that in Feigl's later years, those bugbears of positivism,
subjective phenomena of immediate awareness, cannot be dismissed
out of hand, and can be understood in an"unobjectionable way,"
though he does not specify. One significant statement Feigl
does/ •••
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does make is, "My latest statements are controversial," all of
which goes to reveal the utter complexity of the relationship
between mental and physical , and the realisation that though
teleological and mechanical . causation exclude one another and
that the fonner cannot be analysed in mechanical terms, so much
of our mental life is purposive and that introspective events,
though they must have an explanation, occupy no space. If they
are not in space, many difficul ties arise which would appear to
be less perplexing by a non-Cartesian dualism such as that of
postulating that mental "things" are in one space and physical
things in another, and that they interact from that standpoint.
Feigl leaves open the scientific concept of the openness
of the mass-energy substrate, and regarding physicalism, its
proper function is to attempt to analyse and render a coherent
account of experience in terms of basic physical concepts
alone.
~taterialists have little option if we accept Aristotle's
statement of mind's unification with God, or allied to that,
Broad's thesis (1925) that mentality is an emergent
characteristic composed of a living brain and nervous system and
"something" which is called a psychic factor.
Annstrong, according to Wilson (1979, Ioc , ci t , ) has
unquestionably denonst.rated the "intelligibility and coherence"
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of the materialist physicalist position. a fact which has not
always been appreciated. But there is a comnitment to
behaviourism in shifting the focus of attention from the
behavioural stimulus to the response. so leaving out that
feature of "the mind" that is found to be least amenable to a
materialistic interpretation. The fact is that one has
continually to revert to the old saying that a brain does not
sufficiently resemble a human being.
Eccles (1977) asks the very important question : "How
did self-consciousness cane to primitive hominids?" but skirted
the issue by replying that. what triggered the beginning of the
gradual emergence of self-consciousness was curiosity and
exploratory sense. Later what lifted up the primitive hominids
was the beginnings of linguistic communication on a
sophisticated level. By skirting the issue. he did not explain
the beginning of consciousness at a much earlier stage and its
emergence to consciousness of the self • though he does admit
that highly skilled tool~aking did precede language. Later in
the discourse. Eccles also did refer to the "rate of growth of
the brain." When it reached that of Neanderthal man. ceremonial
burial gave evidence that primitive man had developed sane
spirituality. which must have become ingrained in the make-up of
early man some time earlier than Neanderthal. but only found its
fuller expression in him.
The important point that Eccles does emphasise is that
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it was not only the growth of brain volume, but the development,
gradually, of different parts of the brain. He emphasises (loc.
cit. p. 225) that far too little consideration to the neuronal
machinery involved in the various manifestations of the
self-conscious mind, has been given in the past. "Philosophers
such as Feigl, Armstrong and others should build their
philosophies upon the best available scientific understanding of
the brain. . Unfortunately, they are content with crude and
antiquated information that often misleads them into espousing
erroneous ideas." He adds however, "It is not claimed here that
our present scientific understanding of the brain will solve any
of the philosophical problems" that face us.
Eccles' theory is that of a dualist-interactionist. The
brain functions as a machine, but one of almost infinite
canplexity and subtlety and, in special regions, under
appropriate conditions, it is open to interaction with the world
of conscious experience. The evolvement of modules or "power
uni ts" in the cerebral cortex could give rise to subtle new
properties associated with the emergence of self-consciousness.
The module is a power unit because it has a system of internal
power generation surrounded by its inhibitory action on adjacent
modules with their own intrinsic power. Even though there is a
form of antagonism between modules, nowhere is there
uncontrolled excitation amongst the one to two million modules,
each with up to ten thousand canponent neurons - inmeasurably
greater dynamic canplexity than "anything else that has ever
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been discovered in the universe."
The limbic system (that part of the old but still
existing part of the brain) was developed from primitive
olfactory (smell) connectivity, but now concerned mostly with
emotional experience, and shown that conscious experiences are
elaborated with their emotional overtones. At the present time
there is no explanation of the action that takes place across
the interface between the self-conscious mind on the one hand
and the modules of the cerebral cortex on the other, which would
provide the key to the interaction of mind and brain. However,
Eccles does attempt to outline the reasons why he is a
dualist-interactionist, basing his hypothesis on factual
research. It is probably one of the most comprehensive theories
on brain~ind relationship known in the world to-day.
Briefly, the hypothesis is that the self-conscious mind
is an "independent enti ty" that is actively engaged in reading
out from the multitude of active centres in the modules of the
liaison areas of the dominant cerebral hemisphere. This amounts
to a superior interpretative and controlling role upon neural
events by way of two-way interaction. In this hypothesis,
primacy is given to the self-conscious mind which during normal
life is engaged in searching for brain events that are in its
present interest and in integrating these into the unified
conscious experience that we have from moment to moment, a sort
of scanning operation over the hundreds of thousands of cortical
modules that potentially are capable of being open to inter-
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action with the mental world.
The investigations of Sperry and associates led to the
discovery of the uniqueness and exclusiveness of the daninant
hemisphere in respect of conscious experience, and the
conclusion is that it is only a sPeCialized zone of the cerebral
hemispheres that is in liaison with the se'lf'-consctous mind
(loc. cit. p. 358). A further hypothesis of Eccles is that the
self~onscious mind exercises a superior interpretative and
controlling role upon the neural events, with the further
conclusion that the unity of conscious experience is provided by
the se.lf-consci.ous mind and not by the neural machinery of the :
liaison areas of the cerebral hemispheres. In this way,
disparate brain events are synthesised into unified conscious
experience of a global character, mind so becoming a controller
and organiser of brain. Eccles believes that self-conscfous
mind emerged precisely for this purpose.
In support of his dualistic postulates and a dualistic
hypothesis, Eccles advances several convincing facts as
evidence. The first of his observations based on such practical
evidence, is that there is a "unitary character" about the
experiences of the selr-conscfous mind. Secondly, there is "a
relationship of interaction giving a degree of correspondence,
but not of identity." Thirdly, experiments have shown that
"there can be a tempered discrepancy between neural events and
the experiences of the self-consc.ious mind," for example in the
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slowing down of experienced time in acute emergencies.
Fourthly, throughout our life we are deliberately employing
brain events when we try to recall a memory, recapture a word
or phrase, or to establish a new memory. Therefore, "there is
the continual experience that the self-conscious mind can
effectively act on the brain events."
The above important four points, advance the hypothesis
that the self-conscious mind (or mind for short) exercises a
superior interpretative and controlling role upon the neural
events. A key component of this hypothesis is that the unity of
conscious experience is provided by the self-conscious mind and
not by the neural machinery of the liaison areas of the cerebral
hemisphere. In other words, the experienced unity cones ; : not
fran a neurophysiological synthesis, but fran the proposed
integrating character of the self-conscious mind.
Such a convincing hypothesis of course presupposes in
the first place that the self-conscious mind has already emerged
in order to give this unity of the self, in all of its conscious
eXPeriences and actions. It would appear that the f irst
effective emergence of mind would be in the region of the
earlier~entionedmodular activities in the liaison areas of the
cerebral cortex, as outlined earlier. In this respect, it has
to be recalled that mind exercises, through its increased
emergent status, an all-embracing organising ability over the
brain I s neural machinery. The present theory here is that in
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primitive hominids, such as the Australopithecines , such
emergence was in its very early stages and the neural machinery
proportionally inadequate, about one third of the brain volume'
of modern man being in existence.
A further point of interest is that there is actually a
"time delay" between what may be termed the "instruction" of the
mind, to pass through the complicated brain machinery, before
resulting in action, a delay of about eight-tenths of a second.
Presumably the time is required in building up the requi sd te
gpatiotemporal patterns in millions of neurons in the cerebral
cortex.
In this hypothesis, the assumption must be advanced that
there is an "essential functional meaning" in all the discrete
neuronal actions in spatiotemporal patterns, otherwise there
would be a loss of infonnation. This involves further knowledge
of the "inner dynamic life" of a module with its ten thousand or
more neurons, that, while it is a component of the physical
world, it is scanned by the self-conscious mind and its activity
organised, and can even make adjustments, so that, for example,
hasty "changes of mind" can be made in emergencies. It is an
essential feature of the hypothesis that the relations between
modules and the self-conscious mind are reciprocal, the
self-conscious mind being both an activator and a conscious
experience. In a more intimate sense, one must not visualise
mind as "passing over" the modules, but as "intimately probing
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into them" and at the same time interpreting and organising the
"machinery" for the module. This form of interaction takes
place in a very rich system of connectivity.
In the foregoing paragraphs, one notes that a strong
dualist hypothest.s has been formulated, with primacy given to
the sel f -conscious mind, which can by its scanning operation,
actively modify the brain. Sperry (1970), the eminent
neurophysiologist, has made a similar proposal, suggesting that
the present interpretation would tend to restore mind to its old
prestigious position over matter.
The above hypothesis of interaction is not refuted by
any existing knowledge. However, what are the philosophical
implications of dualistic-interaction?
In the first place, one could simply dismiss the problem
by denying one or other of the elements, such as did Hobbes,
Lamettrie and T. Huxley. On the other hand, one could adopt
miraculous intervention, such as did Malebranche's
occasionalism, which "adjusted" the relation between two things
which appeared to act on one another but really did not, e.g.
muscular movements following volition are merely an example of




Another solution is the monadology of Leibniz which
agreed with Hobbes, but only in the sense that all bodies are
ultimate quantums of force, active entities, the essential
nature of all bcxiies being force or activity or vitalism. In
this theory each monad itself has a "thought life" or inner
mental activi ty • Interpreted, this implies that the neurons
themselves possessed inner drive or inner desire and each monad
joined with all others to represent the entire universe.
Following through Leibniz's theory, the neurons could not exert
any causal influence on selr-consctous mind, while, on the other
hand, they are not concerned wi th interacting with the body.
The central monad is God, and each monad has its own peculiar
individual nature under a pre--established harmony , So, in a
sense, while Leibniz does not imply interaction, his vital
monads, each in their own individual way, do contribute to the
hannony of living matter.
There is also phsycho-physical parallelism, which is the
view that physical processes and nervous processes vary
together, . a conception of causa.l t ty acting between body and
mind, or vice versa. Leibniz's pre--established hannony largely
"sorted out" difficulties here, as also did Spinoza with his
view that mind and body are parallel manifestations of a single
Infinite Substance, which of course "healed" Descartes'
dualism.
Without giving consideration to the positivistic
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assertion that the whole problem is misconceived in the first
place owing to conceptual confusions arising fran misuse of
language, attention could be given to Sherrington's intriguing
body-mind interaction mechanism, which appeals to the physical
principle of action at a distance, by analogy with
electranagnetic and gravitational force-fields, but it has not
found general appeal.
As far as philosophy is concerned, reference to the
obvious correlation between certain bodily and certain mental
events, is to assert that the bodily and mental events
correspond to each other because they are different attributes
of the same substance. On the other hand, interaction asserts
dualism and that mind and body are different substances, their
interaction sanetimes being confused with parallelism, the fact
that they run parallel, not because there is a causal connection
between them but because they are different sides of the same
thing.
The difficulty of drawing conclusions fran physiological
antecedents about menta.l events must be emphasised, because in
the first place the brain cannot be observed fully when a man is
conscious. On the other hand prediction of future mental events
fran past outwa.rd behaviour is usually only effected by the
indirect process of going back to the mental states we suppose
accompanied or inrnediately preceded the outward behaviour, and




One has to examine many circumstances before
wholeheartedly accepting dualistic-interaction because in the
very first place the neuro-scientist, leaves one with complete
uncertainty what mind "is". We know that it is in time, but not
space, and any argument across this category difference lacks
ccxnplete verifiability. This can be disputed, of course, by
saying there is an intelligible connection to explain
mental-physical interaction, only we do not possess sufficient
intelligence and knowledge to discover it. The fact of such
lack of intelligence should not constitute a valid objection
against it. To this is added the statement by realists, that we
know very little about the internal nature of matter,
insufficient in fact to definitely assert what it can and cannot
cause. With such an argument, it is likely Teilhard de Chardin,
for example, would agree.
A denial of interaction would be to preserve a complete
water-tight mechanical system, but it has to be realised that
mental characteristics are very different from mere bodily
characteristics, and so there is no reason to suppose that the
mode of causation they exercise is not very different as well.
On the other hand, all ordinary empirical da ta are causally
related to mental, and vice versa.
Many philosophers deny and even reject the possibility
ofI ...
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of empirical science ever deciding metaphysical issues, or for
that matter, the case in postulating self-conscious mind as a
determining factor in brain manipulation. One such philosopher
is Rose (1976) • Purely physicalist data require to be wi thin
the bounds of a theistic world picture.
Eccles believes (1977, loco cit. p. 557) that the
self-conscious mind has a "mysterious relationship with the
brain, and as a consequence achieves experiences of human love
and friendship, of the wonderful natural beauties and of the
intellectual excitement and joy given by the appreciation and
understanding of our cultural heri.tages. Is it that this life
of ours is simply an episode of consciousness between two
oblivions, or is there sane further transcendent experience of
which we know nothing?"
He also says, dual istic-interactionist hypothesis,
"implies that man is much more than is given by this purely ·
materialistic explanation. I think there is mystery in man, and
I am sure that at least it is wonderful for man to get the
feeling that he isn I t just a hastily made-over ape, and that
there is something much more wonderful in his nature and in his
destiny."
A little later, referring to the evolutionary origin of
mind or self-consciousness and the way it emerged in
relationship to the brain , he points out that there is "some
kind/ •••
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kind of emergent evolutionary process, 11 and added, "if in its
origin it is a derivative of the brain even in this emergent or,
if you like, transcendent way, then in the end we are becoming
somewhat allied to the montst-materfatfsts ," All of which could
make mind simply a "spi.n-otf " from the highly developed brain,
and "sfmp ly use it to act on the brain in all the ways we have
been talking about. 11
The question which still remains unsettled is when, far
back in time, did mind clearly emerge in the hominid line of
primitive man? There is mystery surrounding such a transcendent
emergence , as Dobzhansky implied there was (1967) since there is
only conjecture as to when such a quali ty came to be grafted
onto the brain.
Whatever evidence can be given is derived from artifacts
(if any in very primitive hominids) and such clues found along-
side fossils, but these would be merely evidence of creative
intelligence. A second guide could be that, while still
remaining completely within the theory of natural selection,
that living things, the human animal from the very earliest
times in particular, is invested with creativity in order, in
the case of man, to tame his animal nature and harness or
inhibit the inherited brutality in him. Some would say this is
achieved by divine invisible beings at all times observing our
behaviour. This belief was preached by Gorgias of Leont.Int
several hundred years B.e. , such as a basic belief of his being,
that/ •••
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that if anything did exist, we could never know it, and if by
chance we should come to know it, such as by intuition, we would
not be able to communicate it to others.
Possibly it is preferable to regard creativity in an
almost Bergsonian sense. He was a biologist as well as a
philosopher and was a most influential exponent of the
evolutionary school of his times. The central thesis of his
Vitalism was that life is an autonomous function controlled by
its own laws instead of the laws of physics and chenistry. Such
laws are not in a state of becoming, but are basic assets, and
the chief constituent is a vital impulse comprehended as life or
consciousness, which can only be understood by intuition, as it
is truly · an investiture of God for living things, with the
inference that they can evolve by natural selection and apply it
with increasing advantage.
It has to be appreciated that the identity theory as
pronounced by Annstrong, Smart and others, is not satisfactory
because by intention it is a purely physicalist theory, causal
explanations being in terms of strictly physical theory, and
makes little concession to the fact that human life is closely
linked with mental processes. Epiphenomenalism, as is well
known, holds the theory that mental or spiritual entities are
not realities in their own right but merely by-products of
matter which perish when their material base is dissolved. Soul
and mind are just body in motion, the aetivi ty of a physical
systenj •••
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system. If one could demonstrate that the mental event always
came after the brain event with which it is correlated, it would
prove it was the brain which caused the mental event, a process
which, as has been noted from the foregoing pages, is not easy
to assimilate. It has also been noted that parallelism is a
"one way" version of epiphenomenalism.
On the other hand, interaction maintains that brain
events and mental events hold both ways, that is, there is
reverse action, for example in consciousness having a real
biological survival value in that it would organise the
performance of the whole animal and effectively control its
reactions to situations. In later version, such as that of
self-consciousness in the human brain, the value goes further
and is extended to spiritual input and output as a concern of
the brain~ind complex.
Interaction, instead of acting "through the pineal
gland, " acts through neuronic modules in the brain itself.
Descartes did put forward an interactionist theory, but it
required the clarification of neuroscience to bring the theory
closer to possibility.
Ewing states (1985, loco cit. p. 123) that a philosopher
"should be an adept at casting doubts on the apparently
obvious." His answer to interactionism would be that some other
way/ ...
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way must be found, to those who object in the case of
interaction, by explaining the empirical facts which show that
there is at least a very frequent correlation between certain
bodily and certain mental events. The most popular way of doing
so in modern times has been to assert that the bodily and mental
correspond to each other because they are different attributes
of the same substance. If one could not explain causality on
the basis of same substance, the only recourse would be God.
As regards being the same substance, we already know so
little about the internal nature of matter, that it is difficult
to decide what it can and cannot do. Nor is it clear that we
know a priori that cause and effect cannot be unlike, but we do
know that bodily and mental events are at any rate both in time
and, most important, that mental events are in "sane way"
spatially localized.
The phenanenon of mental autonomy which has gradually
emerged with development of brain, now threatens to becanne an
overruling force in human affairs. So powerful is this force
that to-day man finds himself "plunged into great puzzlement,
uncertainty and insecurity," as Rauche states (1985); also
earlier he pointed out (1974) that the new concept of knowledge
as it emerges with the discoveries of physics is best
illustrated by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which he
formulated for his quantum physics. Such research in physics
represents a crisis of knowledge leading to the unknowability of
matter/ •••
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matter, which may also be regarded as denoting the inadequacy of
human insight into the nature of causality, hence man's present
preoccupation with functionalism, operationalism and actionalism
and blinding him to his own true nature.
Man's movement forward in emergent evolution is
correlated with the development of the brain~ind complex,
basically a physical process because of the progressive
refinement of the organisation of the neural network.
Therefore, while we trace the origin of social, ethical,
moral and religious obligations to man~ade sanctions, they are
really by-products of a process of natural emergence, initiated
at the very beginning of life on earth and which living things
would be unable to halt owing to original embryonic development
under the control of inherited DNA, together with standards of
conduct related to the settings of these physical standards in
the brain.
Mental autonomy it would seem, in conclusion, has not
rescued man from savage and destructive warfare which has
characterised human existence since earliest times. Regrettably
a spirit of insolent pride (Hubris) also exists, initiated by
the remarkable advances in science and physics. Furthermore, it
is present in much of the philosophy of to-day, which, to quote
Rauche again (1974), is "inextricably linked with the dynamic,
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critical, controversial and reflective nature" of thinking,
blinding and preventing man from leading his existence as a free
individual within the cosmic pattern.
In short, he faces an impasse at this stage of
philosophic thinking and one cannot help feeling that he has
tended to sever himself from the true natural environment,
either by unwittingly destroying it, or by regarding it as
hostile.
The concern of this thesis has been to show how man has
biologically evolved in the natural environment, with particular
emphasis on the gradual natural emergence of his now remarkable
mental capacity. In consequence, then, it seems quite
irrational that he should in any way, either wittingly or
unwittingly, disrupt the milieu to which he owes so much.
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SunInary of Chapter Four
Descartes by his philosophy of dualism, restored the
strict spirit of Catholicism, discarding the anthropanorphic
direction in metaphysics and physics inherited from the Greeks.
In recent times, research in neurophysiology has been
increased, the trend in thought being that mental capaci ty was
intimately tied-up with physiology. The philosophy of
brain-mind identity, appearing frequently in present day
publications, concentrated on this aspect.
Despi te the intensity of contemporary biological and
neurophysiological research, the nature of mental capacity
continues to remain elusive. However, a reasonable
interpretation is that what is known as mind is an organising
ability within the neural brain complex, creating models for the
future.
In the course of emergence of mind, awareness evolved into
self-awareness, and consciousness into self-consciousness. In
fact there are many little understood aspects of mental capacity
which lie beyond understanding and by many are grouped under
psychic factors.
The hypothesis of dualistic interaction is considered a
realistic exposition of brain-mind relationship.
In/ •••
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In particular the interpreation of the perfonnance of inner
dynamic mental forces by brain neuronic modules, seems
important.
The feature of man's so-called cultural stage, dating
back some thousands of years, has been the fuller attainment of
mental autonomy, Such a remarkable mental state, however, is
not without canplexity , much of which refers back to the
influences of man's long history on this planet. Indeed such
realisation should provide him with a deeper understanding of
the problems inherited also in mental autonany.
It is anticipated that as mental autonomy develops
further in emergent; evolution, greater fulfilment and closer
harmony may well be achieved by man.
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BRIEF OVERAlL SUMMARY
In the process of evolution of man dating back some two
million years or so, the physical brain has increased three fold
in volume. Such increase was rapid in the last three hundred
thousand years or so, associated more or less with the so-called
cultural stage.
The emergence of mind, or mental capacity, followed
suit, suggesting that this faculty was closely connected with
progressive brain development.
The hypothesf.s exists that mind could not have emerged
from inert physical matter (brain) unless matter contained in
itself a "forward essence" at its creation.
It is maintained that the evolution of the highly
sophisticated neuronal brain structure has resulted in the
remarkable emergence of mind in man.
To such an extent has this mental capacity evolved,
facili tated by the miracle of neuronal structure and
connectivity, that it has now emerged into a state of autonomy.
Such mental autonomy brings with it difficulties
associated with the process of living under rapidly changing
conditions, and as a result mankind is becoming acutely aware of
continued need for responsible reappraisal of future direction
in human affairs on this planet.
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